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VEIL OF IGNORANCE: TUNNEL CONSTRUCTIVISM 
IN FREE SPEECH THEORY 
Andrew Koppelman 
ABSTRACT—Modern free speech theory is dominated in the courts and the 
academy alike by a constructivist style of reasoning: it posits a few 
axiomatic purposes of speech and from these deduces detailed rules of law. 
This way of thinking can make the law blind to the actual consequences of 
legal rules and damage both individual liberty and democracy. I develop 
this claim through a critique of the work of Martin Redish, who has 
developed the most sustained and sophisticated constructivist theory of free 
speech. Free speech constructivism is not the only way to understand the 
First Amendment. It is a fairly recent development, emerging only in the 
1970s. The idea of free speech, on the other hand, dates back to Milton’s 
arguments in the 1640s. This Article identifies the pathologies of 
constructivism and recovers an older, more attractive free speech tradition. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Modern free speech theory is dominated, in the courts and the 
academy alike, by a style of reasoning that posits a few axiomatic purposes 
of speech: “It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an 
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately 
prevail . . . .”1 “The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are 
complementary components of the broader concept of ‘individual freedom 
of mind.’”2 “The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use 
information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-
 
1 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
2 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). 
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government and a necessary means to protect it.”3 From these axioms one 
deduces detailed rules of law and deems irrelevant any consequences that 
were not taken account of in that deduction. This way of thinking, which I 
will call “tunnel constructivism,” can damage both individual liberty and 
democracy. 
Tunnel constructivism is a subset of a broader kind of political theory, 
called “constructivism” by John Rawls, that tries to derive concrete 
prescriptions for action from a parsimonious set of premises. Tunnel 
constructivism differs from generic constructivism in that the tunnel 
constructivist deliberately ignores the consequences of those prescriptions, 
including consequences that most people would deem relevant as a matter 
of common sense. The metaphor of tunnel constructivism is intended to 
capture both of these characteristics. In a tunnel, there is only one direction 
you can go, and the tunnel prevents you from seeing anything outside. 
Tunnel vision is to be expected in a tunnel. Tunnel constructivism is not 
confined to free speech—libertarian views about property and contract are 
other examples—but the theory is salient and increasingly influential in the 
free speech context. 
The conjunction of these two properties, deduction and consequence 
insensitivity, define tunnel constructivism. Deduction is necessary but not 
sufficient. The theorist must also be disposed to give deduction’s 
consequences overriding weight. A principle can have a deductive 
provenance without having absolute strength.4 
Constructivism in some sense is unavoidable. For example, the 
deduction of a political prescription from a narrow set of premises is 
characteristic of all law. More generally, the procedure of inferring a plan 
of action from a few premises, and of following standardized behavioral 
protocols, is an inevitable and valuable part of normal human conduct. We 
could not get through a single hour without routines. But none of this 
requires blindness to consequences at the architectonic level, in the creation 
of the routines themselves. It is this blindness that distinguishes tunnel 
constructivism.5 Blindness to consequences usually reflects nothing more 
than the limits of human intelligence. In the specific pathology I am 
describing, the blindness is an effect of the constructivism: one clings to a 
plan of action in the teeth of manifestly destructive results because one is in 
the grip of a philosophical construct that tells him that these results don’t 
matter. In the free speech area, the aim of tunnel constructivism is not 
 
3 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010). 
4 I owe this formulation to Frederick Schauer. 
5 Of course, this blindness does not matter if the consequences being neglected are in fact 
negligible, or if the commonsense tendency to care about them is itself pathological, for example by 
being a manifestation of prejudice. (That is the appeal of the ideal of color-blindness in law, for 
example.) What makes tunnel constructivism pathological is that it ignores consequences that 
manifestly matter. 
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merely to prevent judges from considering consequences. All law does that. 
The aim is to insulate an entire civilization from cognizing certain 
consequences of legal rules. 
If my real grievance is consequence insensitivity, why make deduction 
part of the definition?6 I do so because tunnel constructivism is a distinctive 
syndrome. Compare a case where a medicine causes diabetes in some 
patients. The grievance is diabetes, but etiology matters: diabetes has many 
causes, most of them unrelated to this drug. The pattern of causation 
between this drug and the diabetes is a distinctive problem. If you want to 
prevent diabetes, you should disaggregate its causes and study them one at 
a time. Similarly, consequence insensitivity has many causes. Here I 
examine one of them, a particular abuse of constructivism. 
Tunnel constructivism is not the only way to understand the First 
Amendment. The effort to deduce free speech rules from a parsimonious 
set of principles is a fairly recent development, emerging only in the 1970s. 
The idea of free speech, on the other hand, dates back to Milton in the 
1640s. This Article will identify the pathologies of tunnel constructivism 
and recover an older and more attractive free speech tradition. 
That tradition is not deductive at all. It is frankly result oriented. Its 
goal is a vibrant sphere of public discourse, where antagonistic views 
compete for public acceptance and dissenting ideas proliferate. It rests on 
mutually reinforcing ideals of individual character and collective identity. 
Rules are tools, created to protect the functioning of this sphere. Judges are 
given discretion to devise such rules for the mundane reason that they are 
more likely than legislatures to protect speech in an appropriate way. The 
test of any rule is precisely its consequences: does it help to produce 
thriving public discussion and culture in a society of free, self-governing 
people? 
I. THE PATHOLOGIES OF TUNNEL CONSTRUCTIVISM 
I begin with three examples of the pathologies of tunnel 
constructivism. 
Campaign finance reform legislation typically restricts both campaign 
contributions and independent expenditures on elections. These restrictions 
raise First Amendment issues because they restrain political 
communication, but it is argued that they are necessary because they 
prevent political corruption. Sometimes, when private interests spend large 
amounts of money to help elect officeholders, their reward is that they get 
to decide what the officeholders do with their offices. In the limit case, 
large donors write legislation, confident that legislators who owe them 
favors will rubber-stamp what they produce. 
 
6 Thanks to Vince Blasi for pressing me on this question. Both he and Richard Fallon demanded a 
clearer general definition of the kind of constructivism that I am criticizing. 
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Opponents of such restrictions have offered two responses. One is an 
empirical challenge: they claim that large donations and independent 
expenditures do not, in fact, purchase political influence. (I express no 
opinion here about whether they are right.) If the empirical predicate of the 
restrictive legislation is false, then it cannot constitute a compelling 
interest. Everything turns on the correct description of the world. 
However, the Supreme Court, when it recently invalidated the 
McCain–Feingold campaign finance law in Citizens United v. FEC, offered 
a different response. It declared that even if these claims of purchased 
political power are accurate, it doesn’t matter. When campaign speech by 
private donors is restricted, “the electorate [is] deprived of information, 
knowledge and opinion vital to its function.”7 Any restriction on campaign 
speech “uses censorship to control thought. This is unlawful. The First 
Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.”8 Even if large 
amounts are spent to influence elections, and even if the large spender 
succeeds in swaying the result and so purchases the winner’s gratitude (or 
fear), this willingness to spend “presupposes that the people have the 
ultimate influence over elected officials.”9 The donor may have frequent 
access to the official, and the official may respond to each of the donor’s 
concerns with an abject eagerness to please, but this is not corruption 
unless there is a one-for-one trade of financial support for legislative 
favors. “The fact that speakers may have influence over or access to elected 
officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt . . . .”10 The way in 
which the Court conceives the world entails that the alleged corruption is 
invisible and irrelevant.11 
Another pathology of tunnel constructivism is its response to tobacco 
advertising. The tobacco industry depends on recruiting teenagers: 60% of 
smokers begin by the age of fourteen,12 and 90% begin smoking before 
twenty.13 Nicotine is perhaps the most addictive drug in existence, far more 
so than heroin or cocaine.14 Most smokers want to quit and are unable to do 
 
7 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 907 (quoting United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 144 (1948) 
(Rutledge, J., concurring in the result)). 
8 Id. at 908. 
9 Id. at 910. 
10 Id. 
11 The opinion might also be read as an example of the Court merely applying preexisting free 
speech rules in good stare decisis fashion, having silently considered and rejected the arguments for 
departing from or reshaping these rules. There is, however, no evidence in the opinion itself to support 
this charitable reading. Thanks to Heather Gerken for pressing me on this point. 
12 See Vincent Blasi & Henry Paul Monaghan, The First Amendment and Cigarette Advertising, 
256 JAMA 502, 503 (1986). 
13 MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, AGAINST EXCESS: DRUG POLICY FOR RESULTS 443 n.27 (1992). 
14 Kleiman reports: 
 Some evidence about what might be thought of as capture ratios for various drugs—the 
proportion of their users who go on to compulsive use—comes from the surveys conducted by the 
Gordon S. Black Corporation. Respondents were asked both whether they had ever tried a given 
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so.15 There is substantial evidence that advertising helps induce teenagers to 
begin smoking.16 For this reason, tobacco advertising has been severely 
restricted.17 
In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,18 however, the Court invalidated a 
statute barring billboard advertising of tobacco products within 1000 feet of 
a school or playground. The Court did not dispute the state’s evidence that 
tobacco advertising recruits children to the use of an addictive and deadly 
drug.19 Even if these claims were true, it didn’t matter. “We must consider 
that tobacco retailers and manufacturers have an interest in conveying 
truthful information about their products to adults, and adults have a 
corresponding interest in receiving truthful information about tobacco 
products.”20 The burden on speech, the Court held, was too “onerous”21 to 
survive scrutiny. 
With both campaign finance and tobacco advertising, the Court 
thought that unrestricted speech simply means that the public is getting 
more information. Perhaps, in both cases, the public is being manipulated 
and harmed. The Court held, in both cases, that awareness of the 
manipulation and the harm are impermissible from the standpoint of free 
speech theory, which must assume, in the teeth of massive evidence to the 
 
drug and whether they had ever “felt ‘hooked’ on” that drug. Nicotine was the outlier: 59 percent 
of those who had ever smoked a cigarette reported that they had been dependent at one time or 
another. The only other form of drug taking with a capture ratio greater than 1 in 5 was smoking 
cocaine (22 percent). The ratios for the other three powerful mass-market drugs were remarkably 
close together: 17.1 percent for alcohol, 16.6 percent for powder cocaine, and 13.7 percent for 
marijuana . . . . 
Id. at 41–42. 
15 Duff Wilson & Julie Creswell, Where There’s No Smoke, Altria Hopes There’s Fire, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2010, at BU1 (“Cigarette profits are growing thanks to price increases and a customer 
base of people who haven’t kicked the habit. About 70 percent of the nation’s 46 million smokers say 
they want to quit, government surveys show, and about 40 percent try every year. But only 2.5 percent 
succeed, the surveys say. The government estimates that 400,000 Americans die of smoking-related 
diseases each year.”). 
16 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 558 (2001) (“[C]hildren smoke fewer brands 
of cigarettes than adults, and those choices directly track the most heavily advertised brands, unlike 
adult choices, which are more dispersed and related to pricing. Another study revealed that 72% of 6 
year olds and 52% of children ages 3 to 6 recognized ‘Joe Camel,’ the cartoon anthropomorphic symbol 
of R. J. Reynolds’ Camel brand cigarettes. After the introduction of Joe Camel, Camel cigarettes’ share 
of the youth market rose from 4% to 13%.” (citations omitted)). 
17 Most recently, the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. 111-31, 123 
Stat. 1776 (2009), gave the Food and Drug Administration broad authority over tobacco, including the 
power to regulate tobacco marketing. The constitutionality of this provision has not yet been tested. 
18 533 U.S. 525. 
19 Id. at 556–61. 
20 Id. at 564. 
21 Id. 
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contrary, that citizens are competent and capable of processing 
information.22 
More generally, free speech theory seems to prohibit government 
restrictions on speech that are based on the desire to have certain kinds of 
speech flourish more than others. This attention to consequences is treated 
as a kind of covert viewpoint discrimination, and viewpoint discrimination 
is always impermissible. 
This requirement of blindness to consequences makes it hard even to 
cognize one of the most pressing contemporary free speech issues, the 
impact of copyright law on speech. Any modification of existing copyright 
law—in fact, any copyright law at all—requires precisely a tradeoff 
between different forms of speech, which must inevitably be animated by a 
choice about which of these forms is judged most desirable.23 
Consider the most parsimonious possible rule of copyright, one that 
bars the simple copying of copyrighted works.24 Copyright is a source of 
income for authors, so it creates an incentive for them to produce speech. 
But it does so by stifling other speech. When the law suppresses pirated 
editions, it keeps the work out of the hands of some people who would 
otherwise consume it.25 We are trading some speech for other speech. 
The same is true of any other rule of copyright law. Whatever level of 
protection is given to authors creates an additional degree of incentive to 
produce, while simultaneously choking off speech that would otherwise be 
produced. You can’t have one without the other. If such judgments are 
impermissible, then it is impossible even to begin to think about copyright 
law’s effect on free speech. 
Neil Netanel observes that “copyright has come increasingly to 
resemble and be thought of as a full-fledged property right rather than a 
limited federal grant designed to further a particular public purpose.”26 
When copyright law was first enacted in 1790, the maximum term was 28 
years;27 now it can exceed 100 years.28 Authors were originally free to build 
 
22 On the pervasiveness of this assumption, see Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The 
Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799. Lidsky capably shows that 
audiences must be assumed to possess this kind of rationality for some free speech purposes. It does not 
follow that such rationality must be stipulated in all cases. See also Dale Carpenter, The 
Antipaternalism Principle in the First Amendment, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 579 (2004); Frederick 
Schauer, Free Speech and the Assumption of Rationality, 36 VAND. L. REV. 199 (1983) (book review). 
23 See Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in 
Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications 
Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2000). 
24 This was the law at the time of the original Constitution. See NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, 
COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 59 (2008). 
25 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 
44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 726 (2003). 
26 NETANEL, supra note 24, at 6. 
27 Id. at 57. 
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upon, reference, comment upon, or parody previous works. Today, authors 
can be sued if they merely appropriate themes or storylines from earlier 
works, and composers may be liable if their work creates an “impression of 
similarity” with previous work.29 Speech-protective limitations on 
copyright, such as the rule that original expression is protected but ideas are 
not, the privilege of de minimis copying, and the privilege of “fair use,” 
have all been weakened.30 The consequence has been a massive chilling of 
speech, which has redounded to the benefit of a few large media 
conglomerates, such as Time Warner and the Walt Disney Company, that 
own enormous inventories of well-known copyrighted works. 
The Court’s only serious engagement with this problem was Eldred v. 
Ashcroft,31 which upheld Congress’s decision to extend existing copyright 
terms for an additional twenty years, keeping a huge number of works out 
of the public domain for 120 years after their creation. The Copyright Term 
Extension Act was, in large part, a response to lobbying by large corporate 
copyright holders.32 The Act created a heavy burden on speech. Authors’ 
ability to build on earlier work—and nearly all creators do this—was 
massively restricted. There was no corresponding benefit for speech 
because Congress in 1998 could not create additional incentives for authors 
in 1923. 
Yet the Court upheld the Act with remarkable insouciance, showing 
little appreciation for what was at stake.33 “The First Amendment securely 
protects the freedom to make—or decline to make—one’s own speech; it 
bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people’s 
speeches.”34 Eugene Volokh, drawing on a series of canonical First 
Amendment cases, has shown how inconsistent this is with the rest of free 
speech law: 
Speakers often express themselves using words or symbols that communicate 
their own feelings or ideas more effectively than what they themselves could 
have created. Johnson, for instance, didn’t invent flag burning, and the Tinkers 
didn’t invent black armbands. Cohen may have taken the “Fuck the Draft” line 
from someone else, or perhaps may have even bought a ready-made jacket 
with that text. Union members regularly hand out leaflets written by others. 
Whenever someone waves a flag, distributes Bibles, or sings a song (whether 
a protest song or a love song) that others wrote, he is expressing himself using 
 
28 Id. at 57–58. 
29 Id. at 58–59. 
30 Id. at 62–66. 
31 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
32 See Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries of 
Intellectual Property Law, VA. J.L. & TECH., Spring 2004, at 1, 3 n.2, http://www.vjolt.net/vol9/issue2/
v9i2_a04-Depoorter.pdf. 
33 The opinion’s weaknesses are anatomized in NETANEL, supra note 24, at 172–85. 
34 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. 
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“other people’s speech[],” at least in the sense of speech written (and 
sometimes even owned) by other people.35 
The Court in Eldred relied on a model of speech that fails to correspond to 
the way that speech actually is generated in the world. Once more, that 
reality has somehow been filtered out of the picture. 
In campaign finance, in tobacco advertising, and in copyright, the 
Court’s way of thinking about free speech demands that certain destructive 
consequences of speech rules simply do not count: they must be invisible to 
us. 
Of course, any law of free speech will be, to some extent, deductive 
and consequence insensitive. Legal claims must be honored whenever their 
elements have been proven by the party who invokes them.36 This 
narrowing of the legal horizon is especially important in free speech law, 
which aims to protect unpopular, dissenting viewpoints. In the three cases 
just discussed, however, deduction and consequence insensitivity prevail 
even at the architectonic level, in the design of the rules themselves. 
The approach to free speech that now dominates the Court’s thinking 
is not the only way to think about free speech. Rather, it is the product of a 
recent intellectual style that only loosely connects to the foundational 
commitments at the base of free speech tradition. A turn back to those 
foundations reveals that free speech theory can be far more flexible and 
capable of accommodating reality than the Court’s current approach 
implies. 
The Court’s approach is the consequence of “free speech tunnel 
constructivism”: the effort to work out determinate rules of free speech 
from a few simple premises and to filter out all information not involved in 
that deductive enterprise. It takes multiple forms because different 
constructivisms have different starting points, but it is united by its style of 
reasoning. 
Free speech tunnel constructivism in its pure form is only to be found 
in the academy. The Supreme Court has never adopted a single 
constructivist theory of speech. But constructivism’s deductive style, 
particularly its tendency to filter salient harms of speech out of 
consideration even at the highest level of decisionmaking, has become a 
part of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Some of free speech constructivists’ 
most urgent concerns, such as the protection of campaign contributions and 
commercial speech, are now the law. 
 
35 Volokh, supra note 25, at 726–27 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). 
36 Clifford Geertz observes that “the defining feature of legal process” is “the skeletonization of 
fact so as to narrow moral issues to the point where determinate rules can be employed to decide them.” 
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 170 (3d 
ed. 2000). 
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There have been two waves of tunnel constructivism in free speech 
theory. The first wave attempted a positive account of free speech, working 
out detailed doctrinal prescriptions. More recently, skeptical writers, 
criticizing the work of the first wave but sharing its assumption that any 
free speech theory must be tunnel constructivist, have concluded that no 
coherent defense of free speech is possible. 
This Article proposes a different approach. Free speech, I will argue, is 
a historical artifact aimed at a contingent set of purposes that emerged from 
the Protestant Reformation, the scientific revolution, emergent patterns of 
democratic governance, and the Romantic ideal of authenticity. It aims at 
the realization and preservation of distinctive, interlocking ideals of 
individual character and public discourse—ideals that first emerged in the 
1600s and that persist today. If free speech is a universal human right, it is 
because all members of every culture have an urgent interest in living in a 
regime whose public and private institutions realize some form of those 
ideals. 
Part II of this Article introduces constructivism by describing the work 
of John Rawls, the most prominent modern constructivist political theorist 
(and the coiner of the term), and James Madison, principal author of the 
First Amendment and, I shall argue, the most successful constructivist 
theorist of free speech. It concludes by noting the limitations of Madison’s 
approach with illustrations from incitement and defamation law. Part III 
examines modern free speech tunnel constructivism, primarily by a critique 
of its most distinguished and persistent exponent, Martin Redish. I also 
engage the new negative tunnel constructivists, Larry Alexander and 
Stanley Fish. Part IV describes the earlier tradition, focusing on John 
Milton and John Stuart Mill, and more briefly considering free speech’s 
leading defenders in the early twentieth century, such as Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Louis Brandeis, Alexander Meiklejohn, and Thomas Emerson, the 
most influential theorist just before the new wave of tunnel constructivist 
theories. Part V offers a synthesis of this tradition, describing the 
institutions and traits of personal character upon which the system of free 
expression depends. Rules are to be judged by how well they keep these 
institutions and traits in good working order. Part VI returns to the 
problems with which the Article began by showing that a more substantive 
approach to free speech law can do better than tunnel constructivism at 
producing sensible answers to the problems of campaign finance, 
commercial speech, and copyright law. A brief Conclusion follows. 
II. CONSTRUCTIVISM 
A. Rawlsian Constructivism 
Constructivism in free speech theory is often presented as the only 
possible way to think about free speech, but it is a recent development. It 
began in the early 1970s. During this time, John Rawls created a revolution 
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in political philosophy. Before Rawls, Anglo-American philosophers 
scrupulously eschewed any substantive claims about morality or politics 
because “[t]hey were determined not to compromise the rational purposes 
of conceptual clarification with expressions of purely personal feeling.”37 It 
was thought that normative political philosophy was dead: utilitarian, 
Marxist, and natural rights ideas had all been shown to be equally 
indefensible.38 
Rawls brought about a methodological revolution. “The instant 
achievement of A Theory of Justice was to show that questions of great 
ethical urgency, such as the proper balance between liberty and equality, 
could be discussed without the slightest loss of rational rigor or 
philosophical rectitude.”39 Rawls is the most sophisticated modern 
proponent of social contract theory—a tradition going back to Hobbes, 
Locke, and Rousseau. He proposed that society should be seen as a scheme 
of cooperation among equals. In order for the social contract to be fair, its 
terms should be those that would be devised in a hypothetical “original 
position,” without any of the parties knowing their position in society, most 
relevantly whether they would be rich or poor.40 Even those who disagreed 
with details of Rawls’s theory—libertarian Robert Nozick41 most prominent 
among them—were nonetheless impressed by this possibility. The early 
1980s saw an explosion of new work in normative political theory.42 
It probably is not coincidental that in the decade following the 
publication of Rawls’s book, free speech theories in the Rawlsian style, 
attempting to deduce a detailed doctrinal structure from a narrow set of 
premises, proliferated.43 Different theorists relied on different premises. 
Robert Bork, Lillian BeVier, and John Hart Ely invoked democracy.44 
David Richards invoked individual dignity.45 T.M. Scanlon invoked 
Millean self-direction.46 C. Edwin Baker invoked self-expression.47 
 
37 Judith N. Shklar, Injustice, Injury, and Inequality: An Introduction, in JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 
HERE AND NOW 13, 13 (Frank S. Lucash ed., 1986). 
38 See IAN SHAPIRO, POLITICAL CRITICISM 3–4 (1990). 
39 Shklar, supra note 37. 
40 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11–12 (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS (1971)]; JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 10–11 (rev. ed. 1999) [hereinafter RAWLS (1999)]. 
41 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). 
42 See SHAPIRO, supra note 38, at 3–8. 
43 For a discussion of the similarity between these theories and that of Rawls, see STEVEN H. 
SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 110–39 (1990). 
44 Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and 
Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First 
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the 
Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975). 
45 David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First 
Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974). 
46 Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972). 
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Benjamin DuVal invoked the need to correct erroneous beliefs.48 Martin 
Redish invoked self-realization.49 
It is impossible to prove that Rawls’s work caused this proliferation, 
just as it is impossible to prove that, as Leonard Krieger alleges in his 
history of eighteenth-century Europe, Pietist Protestantism and the German 
Enlightenment’s growing emphasis on emotions is reflected in the growing 
fluidity and passion of the later music of Haydn and Mozart.50 But the 
similarity of argumentative style is striking. More importantly, although 
these writers’ arguments shared many of the strengths of Rawls’s approach, 
they also acquired, and indeed accentuated, his vulnerabilities.51 
Political constructivism, as Rawls understands it, begins with a 
conception of free and rational persons that is implicit in modern 
democratic culture. It holds that “the principles of political justice (content) 
may be represented as the outcome of a certain procedure of construction 
(structure).”52 Constructivism in ethics holds that ethical principles are 
constructed by human agents for human purposes, that these principles can 
establish practical prescriptions, and that those recommendations can be 
justified.53 The constructivism Rawls offers “holds that moral objectivity is 
to be understood in terms of a suitably constructed social point of view that 
 
47 C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1 
(1976); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 
(1978). 
48 Benjamin S. DuVal, Jr., Free Communication of Ideas and the Quest for Truth: Toward a 
Teleological Approach to First Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161 (1972). 
49 Martin H. Redish, Campaign Spending Laws and the First Amendment, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 900 
(1971); Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the 
Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971). I also note Thomas Jackson and John 
Jeffries, who thought free speech rested on two values: democracy and individual self-fulfillment. 
Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the 
First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979). 
50 LEONARD KRIEGER, KINGS AND PHILOSOPHERS, 1689–1789, at 151, 218 (1970). 
51 Although the 1970s saw a great deal of scholarship in the constructivist style, there are important 
exceptions. For example, Laurence H. Tribe worked very much in the mode of Thomas Emerson. 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 576–736 (1st ed. 1978); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 326–42. Tribe sets forth some general speech values, TRIBE, supra, at 576–79, and 
then he proceeds to devise doctrines consistent with, but not deduced from, these values. Vincent Blasi 
emphasizes the function of speech in checking the abuse of official power, but states: “I do not purport 
to offer a comprehensive ordering of First Amendment values or to suggest that the checking value 
should form the cornerstone of all First Amendment analysis.” Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in 
First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 528. 
52 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 89–90 (expanded ed. 2005). 
53 See Onora O’Neill, Constructivism in Rawls and Kant, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
RAWLS 347, 348 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003). O’Neill also notes that the term “constructivism” is 
commonly used to refer to antirealist views, holding that there are no distinctively moral facts or 
properties. Id. at 347–48. This aspect of constructivism is irrelevant here. 
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all can accept. Apart from the procedure of constructing the principles of 
justice, there are no moral facts.”54 
The term “constructivism” does not appear in A Theory of Justice; 
Rawls uses it in a retrospective description of his work.55 The description is 
nonetheless apt. The parsimonious conception of persons and their needs in 
the original position, and the decision procedure modeled in A Theory of 
Justice, generates the principles of justice. Rawls aims to show that 
acceptance of those principles “is the only choice consistent with the full 
description of the original position. The argument aims eventually to be 
strictly deductive.”56 
Rawls is not, however, a tunnel constructivist. His deductions take 
place within a larger account of justification that he calls “reflective 
equilibrium,” in which we try to bring our considered moral judgments into 
line with our more general principles. “A conception of justice cannot be 
deduced from self-evident premises or conditions on principles; instead, its 
justification is a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of 
everything fitting together into one coherent view.”57 Any general theory 
must be consistent with the specific judgments “in which we have the 
greatest confidence,” such as our judgments “that religious intolerance and 
racial discrimination are unjust.”58 These are “provisional fixed points 
which we presume any conception of justice must fit.”59 The deduction, in 
short, does not always go in one direction for Rawls. “It is a mistake to 
think of abstract conceptions and general principles as always overriding 
our more particular judgments.”60 
Freedom of thought and speech, Rawls thought, were among the basic 
liberties that his theory entailed.61 The protection of sedition, for example, 
was a necessary condition of democracy.62 But his endorsement of free 
speech was qualified by his more fundamental commitments. He was 
prepared to limit speech for the sake of political liberty, which “must be 
approximately equal, or at least sufficiently equal, in the sense that 
everyone has a fair opportunity to hold public office and to influence the 
outcome of political decisions.”63 For these reasons, he criticized the 
 
54 JOHN RAWLS, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory (1980), in COLLECTED PAPERS 303, 307 
(Samuel Freeman ed., 1999). 
55 See O’Neill, supra note 53, at 350–51. 
56 RAWLS (1971), supra note 40, at 121; RAWLS (1991), supra note 40, at 104. 
57 RAWLS (1971), supra note 40, at 21; RAWLS (1991), supra note 40, at 19. 
58 RAWLS (1971), supra note 40, at 19; RAWLS (1991), supra note 40, at 17. 
59 RAWLS (1971), supra note 40, at 20; RAWLS (1991), supra note 40, at 18. 
60 RAWLS, supra note 52, at 45. For a good discussion of the role of reflective equilibrium in 
Rawls’s work, see SAMUEL FREEMAN, RAWLS 29–42 (2007). 
61 The basis for this conclusion was underspecified in A Theory of Justice, but Rawls clarified it in 
his later work. See FREEMAN, supra note 60, at 53–59. 
62 RAWLS, supra note 52, at 342. 
63 Id. at 327. 
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Supreme Court’s unwillingness to let Congress freely regulate campaign 
finance and supported public financing of campaigns, limits on private 
political advertising paid for by interested industries, and access to public 
broadcasting.64 
Samuel Freeman has observed that the “overriding concern” of all of 
Rawls’s work “is to describe how, if at all, a well-ordered society in which 
all agree on a public conception of justice is realistically possible.”65 To 
Rawls, a well-ordered society “is a society all of whose members accept, 
and know that the others accept, the same principles (the same conception) 
of justice.”66 Rawls’s theory aims to establish a stable basis for mutually 
respectful political life in a society that is profoundly divided about the 
good life. Political liberalism is first and foremost a response to a problem: 
“[H]ow is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of 
free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable 
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?”67 
Rawls’s answer is that citizens can agree upon the basic structure that 
parties in the hypothetical “original position” would agree to. In the 
original position, a “veil of ignorance” prevents any of the parties from 
knowing such morally irrelevant facts as their position in society and 
conception of the good.68 The argument depends, of course, on a prior 
determination that what is put behind the veil is in fact morally irrelevant.69 
Rawls argues that people with different comprehensive conceptions of 
the good—and disagreement about such comprehensive conceptions is a 
chronic condition of modern society—can and should reach an 
“overlapping consensus” on the principles of political cooperation.70 In an 
overlapping consensus, they may disagree about the ultimate foundations 
of the political principles that govern them, but they agree upon the 
principles and that those principles are moral and affirmed on moral 
grounds.71 Rawls’s aspiration depends upon there being enough people with 
reasonable comprehensive views to make an overlapping consensus 
possible. 
 
64 Id. at 356–63. 
65 SAMUEL FREEMAN, JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS ON RAWLSIAN POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 4 (2007). 
66 JOHN RAWLS, A Kantian Conception of Equality (1975), in COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 54, 
at 254, 255. 
67 RAWLS, supra note 52, at 4. 
68 See RAWLS (1971), supra note 40, passim; RAWLS (1999), supra note 40, passim. 
69 The argument works better with one’s position in society than it does with one’s conception of 
the good. My idea of the good is not obviously morally arbitrary in the way that my inherited privileges 
are. I value ends not because they happen to be mine, but because I think they are worthy, worthy for 
anyone. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 129–
39 (1993); GEORGE SHER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY: PERFECTIONISM AND POLITICS 79–83 (1997). 
70 RAWLS, supra note 52, passim. 
71 Id. at 144–50. 
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Rawls’s constructivism intentionally abstracts away from the objects 
of disagreement. Political liberalism, he argues, should be freestanding so 
that it “can be presented without saying, or knowing, or hazarding a 
conjecture about, what [comprehensive] doctrines it may belong to, or be 
supported by.”72 “[T]he political conception of justice is worked out first as 
a freestanding view that can be justified pro tanto without looking to, or 
trying to fit, or even knowing what are, the existing comprehensive 
doctrines.”73 Whether it abstracts too much is an open question. The 
exactness of the physical sciences, Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin 
observe, “is purchased only at a price. They are ‘exact and idealized’ 
because they are highly selective: they pay direct attention only to 
circumstances and cases that are ‘abstracted’ (i.e., selected out) as being 
relevant to their central theoretical goals.”74 Rawls similarly abstracts away 
from the plurality of comprehensive conceptions of the good. 
Rawls understands that each person must fit the constructivist theory 
back into her own comprehensive conception for it to be persuasive to her. 
He never abandons the method of reflective equilibrium. The political 
conception Rawls offers “is a module, an essential constituent part, that fits 
into and can be supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
that endure in the society regulated by it.”75 To accept constructivism in its 
strongest form, you must accept the starting point and every inference that 
is drawn from that starting point, and you must be prepared to override all 
values that conflict with those inferences. Constructivism is always an 
iceberg floating on an ocean of comprehensive views, solidified because of 
the circumstances that make this kind of theory necessary, but 
fundamentally made of the same stuff in which it is afloat. Constructivism 
may be deductive and consequence insensitive, but the comprehensive 
conceptions on which it depends need not be, and probably cannot be. 
Rawls, once more, is not a tunnel constructivist, though the very abstract 
description of the parties in the original position may give that impression. 
 
72 Id. at 12–13. 
73 John Rawls, Reply to Habermas, 92 J. PHIL. 132, 145 (1995). For similar formulations, see JOHN 
RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 37, 188–89 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001); RAWLS, supra note 
52, at xlvii; and JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited (1997), in COLLECTED PAPERS, 
supra note 54, at 573, 585. T.M. Scanlon explains why the strategy of surveying actual comprehensive 
views would not be satisfactory to Rawls: “It would be impossible to survey all possible comprehensive 
views and inadequate, in an argument for stability, to consider just those that are represented in a given 
society at a given time since others may emerge at any time and gain adherents.” T.M. Scanlon, Rawls 
on Justification, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS, supra note 53, at 139, 164. On the other 
hand, as this Article shows, a consensus built around the convergence of a contingent set of actual 
views may last a long time. 
74 ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A HISTORY OF MORAL 
REASONING 31 (1988). 
75 RAWLS, supra note 52, at 12. 
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Because many starting points are available, many constructivisms are 
possible. “[N]ot everything can be constructed and every construction has a 
basis, certain materials, as it were, from which it begins.”76 
An example of a tunnel constructivism that produces results 
antithetical to Rawls’s own ideal of political equality is minimal-state 
libertarianism, which would forbid any redistribution of resources and 
permit the state only to enforce rules of property and contract. Libertarians 
begin with a conception of each person as a holder of whatever property he 
may find himself in possession of in the actual world and then deem 
whatever private contracts these persons enter into to be just. 
Libertarianism is blind to the consequences of its construction of rights: 
There may be vast political inequalities. Some people may even be forced 
to accept slavery.77 But since the process by which this result was reached 
was a just one, these inequalities do not matter. 
This vision of a just society is not liberalism, but rather resembles its 
ancient adversary feudalism, in which parties trade their allegiance for 
protection by the powerful.78 The fundamental error of libertarianism is that 
it takes existing property rights for granted and fetishizes them, instead of 
recognizing property as an institution constructed by human beings for 
human ends, the details of which can and should be specified with those 
ends in mind.79 
Tunnel constructivism is, strictly speaking, not refutable. It generates a 
closed system of results that follow from its premises, and its proponents 
can insist on those results regardless of the consequences. However, there 
must be a threshold decision whether to be constructivist, and this will 
depend on the cost as assessed in terms of one’s comprehensive view. That 
cost may be too high.80 
 
76 JOHN RAWLS, Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, in COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 54, at 
497, 514. 
77 See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 74–88 (1989). 
78 See Samuel Freeman, Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism Is Not a Liberal View, 30 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 105 (2002). 
79 On the specific flaws of Nozick’s libertarian critique of Rawls, see THOMAS W. POGGE, 
REALIZING RAWLS 15–62 (1989). For further exploration of the weaknesses of libertarianism, see 
ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE TOUGH LUCK CONSTITUTION AND THE ASSAULT ON HEALTH CARE 
REFORM (2013), and ANDREW KOPPELMAN WITH TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, A RIGHT TO 
DISCRIMINATE? HOW THE CASE OF BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. JAMES DALE WARPED THE LAW OF 
FREE ASSOCIATION (2009). 
80 See Andrew Koppelman, The Fluidity of Neutrality, 66 REV. POL. 633 (2004) [hereinafter 
Koppelman, The Fluidity of Neutrality]; Andrew Koppelman, The Limits of Constructivism: Can Rawls 
Condemn Female Genital Mutilation?, 71 REV. POL. 459 (2009). Rawls increasingly appreciated the 
costs of constructivism in his later work, in which he narrows the range of claims he thinks can be 
justified, makes more limited claims about the justifications that can be shared, and makes clear that he 
is writing only to an audience of people who already live in liberal democracies and value democracy’s 
institutions. See O’Neill, supra note 53, at 349–53. 
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The cases with which we began show that as with Rawlsian 
constructivism, the Court uses a veil of ignorance to filter out facts it 
regards as not properly relevant to decisions about which speech the law 
may suppress. Here, too, the threshold decision to be tunnel constructivist 
demands justification. 
B. Madisonian Constructivism 
James Madison’s 1799 Report on the Virginia Resolutions is the 
paradigm of free speech constructivism, in part because the author was the 
principal drafter of the First Amendment and in part because it is one of the 
most powerful constructivist arguments that has ever been devised. The 
Sedition Act of 1798 made it a crime to write about Congress or the 
President “with intent to defame” or “to excite against them . . . the hatred 
of the good people of the United States.”81 Madison wrote a resolution, 
subsequently enacted by the Virginia legislature, declaring that the Sedition 
Act was unconstitutional. The Act, the resolution declared, “ought to 
produce universal alarm, because it is levelled against the right of freely 
examining public characters and measures, and of free communication 
among the people thereon, which has ever been justly deemed the only 
effectual guardian of every other right.”82 He supported the resolution with 
a report elaborating on its claims. Madison’s best argument was the 
following: 
1. The Constitution supposes that the President, the Congress, and each of 
its Houses, may not discharge their trusts, either from defect of judgment or 
other causes. Hence they are all made responsible to their constituents, at the 
returning periods of elections; and the President, who is singly intrusted with 
very great powers, is, as a further guard, subjected to an intermediate 
impeachment. 
2. Should it happen, as the Constitution supposes it may happen, that 
either of these branches of the government may not have duly discharged its 
trust, it is natural and proper, that, according to the cause and degree of their 
faults, they should be brought into contempt or disrepute, and incur the hatred 
of the people. 
3. Whether it has, in any case, happened that the proceedings of either or 
all of those branches evince such a violation of duty as to justify a contempt, a 
disrepute, or hatred among the people, can only be determined by a free 
examination thereof, and a free communication among the people thereon.83 
If public officials are to be held accountable by elections, then the electors 
must be able to discuss the merits of the officials. 
 
81 Ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596, 596–97 (1798). 
82 James Madison, The Virginia Report, in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE 
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 231, 243 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981). 
83 Id. at 263–64. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
664 
The argument is elegant and sound in part because it relies not at all on 
the First Amendment’s ambiguous text.84 Rather, it infers a right of free 
speech from the structural commitment to elections. Madison considers 
citizens only in their capacity as voters, ignoring everything else about 
them. If citizens are voters, then it follows that they may vote out the 
incumbents. If they are to do that, then they must be able to communicate 
with one another about whether the incumbents should be voted out of 
office. But the Sedition Act bars them from doing that. Ergo, the Sedition 
Act is inconsistent with the democratic structure. 
C. The Limits of Madisonian Constructivism 
Even here, though, Madison is not a tunnel constructivist. He finds it 
necessary implicitly to deny the view—held by, among others, Alexander 
Hamilton85—that prohibitions of sedition are necessary for democracy 
because seditious speech tends to drive good and capable people away from 
public office, thus hamstringing democracy in a different way.86 And he 
certainly rejects the view famously laid down in Tuchin’s Case, that “it is 
very necessary for every Government, that the people should have a good 
opinion of it.”87 He does not even mention, much less confront, these 
empirical issues. 
Nor does Madison attempt anything like a complete theory of free 
speech. His argument is narrowly confined to the targeted suppression of 
seditious speech. He does not address the protection of any other kind of 
speech88 or even the burdening of seditious speech through means other 
 
84 Madison does not admit his lack of reliance on the text here, but Charles L. Black, Jr. notes it 
when he develops a similar argument in CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 39–45 (1969). 
85 See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT 
OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 34 (2004). John Marshall probably held the same view. See Kurt 
T. Lash & Alicia Harrison, Minority Report: John Marshall and the Defense of the Alien and Sedition 
Acts, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 435 (2007). 
86 For similar contemporaneous views, see DONNA LEE DICKERSON, THE COURSE OF TOLERANCE: 
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA xv, 5–6 (1990). The argument has never 
gone away. Similar concerns were stated by then-Judge (later President and Chief Justice) William 
Howard Taft, see DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 160 (1997), and by 
Justice Byron White, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 400 (1974) (White, J., dissenting). 
This concern is one reason why no other jurisdiction has adopted an approach toward defamation of 
public officials as protective of speech as America. See ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 198–226 
(2d ed. 2005); GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER §§ 15.21–.27, at 547–62 (Patrick Milmo & W.V.H. 
Rogers eds., 11th ed. 2008). 
87 Tuchin’s Case, (1704) 90 Eng. Rep. 1133 (K.B.) 1134, quoted in LEONARD W. LEVY, 
EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 9 (1985). 
88 Other scholars have tried to work out the implications of Madison’s argument. Robert Bork 
famously argued on the basis of Madison’s premises that only political speech was protected. See Bork, 
supra note 44. Alexander Meiklejohn, another neo-Madisonian, resisted this conclusion but had 
difficulty explaining why. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. 
REV. 245, 256–57. For an attempt to push the Madisonian premises to their outer limit, see Andrew 
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than sedition laws, such as the prohibition of incitement to crime or the 
ordinary common law tort of defamation. 
Madison’s view did not prevail in the courts until the twentieth 
century, but many others made arguments like his, albeit less rigorously, at 
the time he wrote and for many years afterward. It quickly became 
conventional wisdom that the Sedition Act had been improper and that 
public discussion of political matters was constitutionally protected.89 
The power of the idea of free speech rested less on logic than on 
settled practice: Leonard Levy notes the “nearly epidemic degree of 
[unpunished] seditious libel that infected American newspapers after 
Independence.”90 In popular culture, the claim for free speech lost its 
logical, constructivist edge and became merely a set of slogans—slogans 
that were nonetheless politically powerful and contributed to a vibrant 
culture of free discussion, at least outside the slaveholding South.91 
Madison became a touchstone for thinking about the incitement 
question, beginning with Judge Learned Hand’s justly celebrated opinion in 
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten.92 Judge Hand tried to use Madisonian 
premises to cabin the speech-repressive implications of the World War I 
espionage law. The statute, Judge Hand argued, could not reasonably be 
construed to “contradict the normal assumption of democratic government 
that the suppression of hostile criticism does not turn upon the justice of its 
substance or the decency and propriety of its temper.”93 Judge Hand’s 
argument, however, was not merely deductive. He relied on many premises 
not derivable from the fact of democracy itself, such as the premise that 
juries are likely to unfairly attribute an illegal purpose to a speaker who 
articulates an unpopular view.94 
The same point applies to other speech-protective incitement tests, 
from the dissenting opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis to the 
Supreme Court’s exceedingly speech-protective test in Brandenburg v. 
Ohio.95 All rest on evaluative and predictive judgments that it is better to 
tolerate than to repress speech that advocates violating the law, so long as 
 
Koppelman, Madisonian Pornography or, The Importance of Jeffrey Sherman, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
597 (2009). 
89 See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE”: STRUGGLES 
FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 52–116, 205–15 (2000). 
90 LEVY, supra note 87, at x. 
91 See generally CURTIS, supra note 89. 
92 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). 
93 Id. at 540. 
94 See VINCENT BLASI, IDEAS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 475–540 (1st ed. 2006). 
95 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
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the connection between the speech and the crime is at least somewhat 
attenuated.96 
New York Times v. Sullivan97 relies on Madisonian constructivism,98 
but it, too, is not resolvable by Madisonian logic alone. The suit against the 
Times did not involve a sedition law. Yet, a government official was 
obviously using tort law to suppress unwelcome criticism. Clearly, strict 
liability for defamation could deter criticism of public officials in a way 
functionally equivalent to sedition law.99 The Court, however, had no way 
to know how much valuable speech was deterred by defamation law or 
how harmful this was to the political process.100 The Court’s argument 
untidily pulls together a number of different considerations to support its 
result: the analogy with seditious libel, the danger of chilling valuable 
speech, the public’s duty to engage in political debate, and the “profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”101 
The opinion also relies on a Stoical character ideal, constituting the 
public realm as a necessarily hurtful place where officials must forfeit 
protections against defamation that ordinary citizens enjoy.102 The Court 
reaches for the best alternative to common law libel available at the time: a 
minority rule in some state courts that comments on public affairs are 
presumptively privileged.103 There is no deduction.104 The opinion’s 
unifying theme is that it is “informed by an overall vision of a free 
society.”105 
 
96 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 41 (2004); Frederick Schauer, Is It Better to Be Safe than Sorry?: Free Speech 
and the Precautionary Principle, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 301 (2009). 
97 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
98 See id. at 274–75. 
99 See HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 60–73 
(Jamie Kalven ed., 1988). 
100 See Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1113, 1115 (1979). 
Subsequent research has gone some way toward clarifying these questions, though much remains to be 
done. See, e.g., THE COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (Everette E. Dennis & Eli 
M. Noam eds., 1989). 
101 N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270. 
102 See JOHN DURHAM PETERS, COURTING THE ABYSS: FREE SPEECH AND THE LIBERAL 
TRADITION 167 (2005). 
103 See KALVEN, supra note 99, at 61. 
104 Fallon notes that Ronald Dworkin’s attempt to justify the decision on constructivist grounds 
ignores the crucial role of instrumental calculations about the amount of self-censorship, good and bad, 
that the press would engage in under different liability regimes. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., 
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 28–31 (2001). Although one of Fallon’s leading articles is A 
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987), he 
is not a tunnel constructivist. 
105 Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. 
REV. 1615, 1637 (1987). 
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Free speech necessarily involves abstraction, a blinkering of 
particulars. In free speech law, 
Nazis become political speakers, profit maximizing purveyors of sexually 
explicit material become proponents of an alternative vision of social 
existence, glorifiers of sexual violence against women become advocates of a 
point of view, quiet residential streets become public forums, and negligently 
false harmful statements about private matters become part of a robust debate 
about issues of public importance.106 
These rules, however, remain created, with an essentially legislative 
discretion, and “anything short of permanent and conclusive entrenchment 
must permit the judge in every case to perceive all of those factors that 
might in the rare case lead to modification of the entrenched category.”107 
Free speech law imposes veils of ignorance on the lower courts that 
administer it.108 Courts must ignore facts that ordinary people would think 
highly relevant. But the architects of law do not themselves belong behind 
that veil. Rather, they should construct the rules in full awareness of their 
probable consequences. 
III. MODERN FREE SPEECH CONSTRUCTIVISM 
Modern free speech constructivists, as noted earlier, do not all follow 
Madison in the core value from which they deduce their speech-protective 
rules. Some, like Madison, start with democracy, but then trace this 
commitment to conclusions more elaborate than anything Madison 
attempted.109 Some start with the goal of individual self-realization.110 Some 
aim at the attainment of truth.111 Some start with Kantian autonomy.112 
 
106 Frederick Schauer, Harry Kalven and the Perils of Particularism, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 397, 397 
(1989) (book review). 
107 Id. at 411. 
108 Here I refer not only to courts below the Supreme Court, but to any court that is obligated to 
follow relevant precedent. A district court deciding a free speech issue of first impression is not a 
“lower court” in this sense. 
109 In addition to the sources cited supra note 44, see ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT (1995); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND 
THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); and James Weinstein, Democracy, Sex and the First 
Amendment, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 865 (2007). Although he thinks that speech 
fundamentally promotes self-realization, Redish also belongs in the democratic-theory camp because he 
thinks self-realization entails democracy, and vice versa. See Martin H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen, 
Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s Mistakes: The Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the 
Theory of Free Expression, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1303 (2009) (elaborating an original account of how 
democracy entails free speech). 
110 In addition to the sources cited supra notes 46–47, 49, see C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY 
AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989); MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS (1984) [hereinafter REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION]; and DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, 
TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 165–227 (1986). 
111 In addition to DuVal, supra note 48, the classic citation for this theory is JOHN STUART MILL, 
ON LIBERTY (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Classics 1987) (1859), although Mill is more 
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Different constructivisms can, of course, yield different results. For 
example, Martin Redish and C. Edwin Baker both aim at self-realization, 
but their different procedures of construction yield opposing results with 
respect to commercial speech.113 And constructivism need not be tunnel 
constructivism: some constructivists are willing to abandon the 
consequences of their theories if the consequences are too severe.114 
As I said at the outset, deductive theory is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition of tunnel constructivism. The theorists just described 
varied considerably in their inclination to ignore consequences other than 
the master values they relied on. For example, T.M. Scanlon began as a 
tunnel constructivist. In a 1972 article, he argued that respect for citizens’ 
autonomy entails that speech cannot be prohibited simply because it results 
in listeners having false beliefs or in listeners coming to believe that they 
ought to perform harmful actions.115 He later recanted precisely because the 
principle was too cost insensitive. A free speech principle should restrict 
the costs that justify restricting speech, but that principle “must itself be 
based on a full consideration of all the relevant costs.”116 
A. Redish 
A definitive critique of tunnel constructivism is probably impossible. 
It would have to survey and respond to every constructivist theory ever 
devised, and even then could not address future tunnel constructivisms that 
 
complicated than this. The Supreme Court has often cited the simple truth-advancement story. See 
BAKER, supra note 110, at 3–24. It is unclear whether the story about emerging truth is doing the work or 
the metaphor of a market that is loaded with unstated assumptions. For the latter view, see ROBERT L. 
TSAI, ELOQUENCE AND REASON: CREATING A FIRST AMENDMENT CULTURE 60–68 (2008), and John 
Durham Peters, The “Marketplace of Ideas”: A History of the Concept, in TOWARD A POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF CULTURE: CAPITALISM AND COMMUNICATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 65 
(Andrew Calabrese & Colin Sparks eds., 2004). 
112 In addition to Richards, supra note 45, see CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT 78–142 (2004); RICHARDS, supra note 110, at 165–227; David 
A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991); and 
Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme Court’s 
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159 (1997). Although Wellington, supra 
note 100, makes a less deductive argument and neglects to draw out the doctrinal implications, he also 
begins with Kantian autonomy. 
113 Compare REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 110, at 60–68, MARTIN H. REDISH, 
MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY 14–62 (2001) 
[hereinafter REDISH, MONEY TALKS], and Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment 
Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67 (2007) 
[hereinafter Redish, Commercial Speech] (concluding that commercial speech is entitled to First 
Amendment protection), with BAKER, supra note 110, at 194–224 (concluding that commercial speech 
deserves no such protection). 
114 See Strauss, supra note 112. 
115 Scanlon, supra note 46. 
116 T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 
519, 533 (1979). 
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might answer its criticisms. All that one can do is take a particularly salient 
example and offer reasons to think that the objections it elicits have 
analogues among its tunnel constructivist rivals. 
I will therefore focus here on the work of Redish, who is the most 
important and influential tunnel constructivist. His very large corpus of 
books and articles on free speech may together constitute the most 
thoroughly worked out theory of this kind that anyone has ever devised.117 
The Supreme Court has cited his First Amendment scholarship five 
times,118 and C. Edwin Baker observes that when the Court decided to give 
heightened protection to commercial speech, it “offered arguments that 
duplicated those that Redish had advanced several years before.”119 The 
same duplication is unmistakable in Citizens United.120 Increasingly, we are 
living in Redish’s free speech world. 
Redish disavows “attempts to resolve complex and difficult issues by 
means of rigid, hard-line distinctions and categorizations.”121 Rather, the 
aim should be “general guidelines of interpretation that simultaneously 
provide the strong deference to free speech interests that the language and 
the policies of the first amendment command while allowing the judiciary 
the case-by-case flexibility necessary to reconcile those interests with truly 
compelling and conflicting societal concerns.”122 As we shall see, however, 
with respect to the free speech issues considered at the outset of this 
Article, Redish is rigid indeed. 
 
117 Most of the leading constructivists of the 1970s wrote one article and then moved on to other 
subjects. See supra notes 44–48 (citing Richards, Bork, BeVier, Ely, Scanlon, and DuVal). Of the 
writers in the constructivist mode, the only author who worked out a position as sustained as Redish’s is 
C. Edwin Baker. See BAKER, supra note 110; C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND 
DEMOCRACY: WHY OWNERSHIP MATTERS (2007); C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND 
DEMOCRACY (2002). Baker, however, is not really a free speech theorist because he gives no special 
weight to speech as compared to other exercises of liberty. I follow Frederick Schauer in holding that a 
free speech principle must at least be “a principle according to which speech is less subject to 
regulation . . . than other forms of conduct having the same or equivalent effects.” FREDERICK 
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 7 (1982). 
For the same reason, I also exclude Ronald Dworkin, who gives no special protection to speech as 
such in his general theory of liberal equality, and whose speech-protective arguments are therefore 
fragile. See RONALD DWORKIN, Do We Have a Right to Pornography?, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 
335 (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, Pornography and Hate and MacKinnon’s Words, in FREEDOM’S LAW: 
THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 214, 227 (1996). For a critique of Dworkin’s 
work, see RAE LANGTON, Whose Right? Ronald Dworkin, Women, and Pornographers, in SEXUAL 
SOLIPSISM: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON PORNOGRAPHY AND OBJECTIFICATION 117 (2009); SCHAUER, 
supra, at 61–65. 
It is also relevant that neither Baker’s nor Dworkin’s theories correspond to the Supreme Court’s 
present free speech doctrine nearly so well as Redish’s. 
118 Westlaw search of “Redish” in the Supreme Court database, Dec. 13, 2012. 
119 C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 981, 982 (2009). 
120 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
121 REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 110, at 3. 
122 Id. 
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1. The Argument for the Self-Realization Value.—Redish’s theory is 
complex, but its basic elements are simple. All speech that is relevant to 
individual or collective decisionmaking is entitled to exactly the same level 
of protection. Laws that restrict speech are subject to strict scrutiny. They 
can be justified only by interests that are truly vital. Some purported 
interests, however—notably the reasons typically given for restricting 
campaign spending and commercial speech—are not even permissible, 
much less compelling, because they are viewpoint discriminatory. 
Redish’s foundational claim is that all values that have been cited to 
support free speech are reducible to a single one: individual self-realization. 
All speech that fosters this value should therefore receive the same 
protection. This first principle “can be proven, not merely by reference to 
some unsupportable, conclusory assertions of moral value, but by reasoning 
from what we in this nation take as given: our democratic system of 
government.”123 He argues that “the moral norms inherent in the choice of 
our specific form of democracy logically imply the broader value, self-
realization.”124 The intrinsic value of democracy, the one “achieved by the 
very existence of a democratic system,” is “the value of having individuals 
control their own destinies.”125 The instrumental value of democracy is 
“development of the individual’s human faculties.”126 It follows that “any 
speech that may aid in the making of private self-governance decisions is 
deserving of first amendment protection.”127 
To support this claim, Redish offers the following hypothetical128: 
Imagine a society in which every decision affecting individuals—dinner 
menus, hairstyles, bedtimes—is made by a collective vote. Under the logic 
of democracy, debate and information about all these decisions would have 
to receive full constitutional protection. Then suppose that all of these 
decisions are ceded to individuals, as our own society does. What sense 
would it make to say that information relevant to those decisions is no 
longer a constitutional right? How can the individual have a right to 
information about decisions he controls indirectly as a voter, yet have that 
right disappear if he is given total authority over the same decisions? 
If these arguments are accepted, then the approach the Court has 
followed since Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,129 “which recognizes a 
sublevel of speech that is unworthy of constitutional protection, would have 
to be abandoned.”130 As we shall see, Redish goes some way toward 
 
123 Id. at 12 (footnote omitted). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 20. 
126 Id. at 21. 
127 Id. at 80. 
128 Id. at 24–26. 
129 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
130 REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 110, at 55. 
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rebuilding the doctrinal structure he attacks on the basis of compelling 
interests, rather than the differential value of speech. Through this 
reasoning, threats, libel of private figures, criminal conspiracies, and 
criminal solicitation would still be denied protection. Because he rules out 
many interests as impermissible, however, the consequence is a radical 
reformulation of the law. 
For the argument to persuade, the reader must accept Redish’s 
articulation of the sole purported moral basis of democracy.131 The 
undefended assumption that a longstanding social institution such as 
democracy must have a single moral basis is surprising.132 Institutions 
evolve. They are not created by designers. Even if someone created the 
institution of free speech, there is no reason to assume that she did it for a 
single purpose. On the contrary, it is likely that any longstanding practice 
serves more purposes than any single human mind can comprehend.133 
Many different people support democracy for many different reasons. 
Redish confronts this difficulty by summarily stating and dismissing a few 
rival justifications. For example, he dismisses the consequentialist 
justification that democracy produces better results than other systems: 
“How are we to decide what is ‘better’? . . . And better for whom?”134 But 
with this move, Redish is no longer discussing the reasons why someone 
might support democracy. He is now looking for only those reasons that 
can persuade any rational person—and his hypothetical rational person is 
paralyzingly skeptical of consequentialist reasoning. An institution may, 
however, be stable over long periods of time without having any 
justification that can persuade all rational persons. (Try justifying the rules 
of baseball to Redish’s hypothetical skeptic.) Democracy could be 
supported for many generations by a society of consequentialists who never 
agree among themselves about which of its consequences make democracy 
good. 
Frederick Schauer’s alternative view is that freedom of speech has no 
essential core, but is instead a cluster of interrelated principles.135 Redish at 
 
131 Contra Farber & Frickey, supra note 105, at 1640–41. 
132 It is, however, an assumption with which Redish begins in the first sentence of his best known 
article on free speech: “Commentators and jurists have long searched for an explanation of the true 
value served by the first amendment’s protection of free speech.” Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free 
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 591 (1982) (emphasis added), reprinted in REDISH, FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION, supra note 110, at 9. 
133 Ronald Allen’s criticisms of high constitutional theory emphasize this idea. See Ronald J. Allen, 
Constitutional Adjudication, the Demands of Knowledge, and Epistemological Modesty, 88 NW. U. L. 
REV. 436 (1993); Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of 
Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149 (1998). 
134 REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 110, at 20. 
135 See SCHAUER, supra note 117, at 14; Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: 
A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 277 (1981); Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First 
Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 285, 313 [hereinafter Schauer, Codifying the 
First Amendment]; Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1302 (1983). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
672 
one point concedes the possibility that free expression might be deemed to 
foster “a complex intersection of multiple values,” but he counters that the 
application of those values to specific cases “would presumably be no more 
or less syllogistic than the shaping of doctrine through the application of an 
assumed single underlying value.”136 If, however, no formula is available 
for weighing these values against one another, then the promised 
syllogisms will never appear. The complex set of incommensurable values 
that together constitute health is one of many reasons why medicine cannot 
be reduced to syllogisms.137 
Redish has described his method as following this procedure: “[A]sk 
why we choose a democratic system in the first place and, by this process 
of reverse engineering, glean more foundational normative values 
underlying the commitment to both democracy and free expression.”138 The 
danger of such reverse engineering, conspicuously instantiated by the 
“scientific creationists,” is that more than one sequence of causes can 
produce a given result. You can’t deduce from any result what process 
must have produced it. 
He also has a different argument, based on the intrinsic value of 
democracy: “[I]t is doubtful that many of us would be anxious to discard 
democracy even if it were established definitely that an alternative political 
system was more efficient.”139 So Redish’s audience is only those who 
think democracy is intrinsically valuable, not those who support democracy 
only because of its good results. But even some who value democracy 
intrinsically do so not because of democracy’s positive contribution to self-
realization, but for its negative effect of preventing citizens from 
tyrannizing over one another. Consider Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the most 
influential proponent of the intrinsic value of democracy. Rousseau, with 
no inconsistency, was an energetic proponent of censoring the arts and 
religious opinions.140 Rousseau loved democracy but hated individual self-
 
Schauer’s Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, supra note 117, published in 1982, reacted to the 
constructivisms of the 1970s, surveying the various premises that had been offered and trying to work 
out what can really be deduced from each of them. 
136 Redish, Commercial Speech, supra note 113, at 104. 
137 See infra text accompanying notes 233–43. 
138 Redish & Mollen, supra note 109, at 1337 n.159. 
139 REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 110, at 20. 
140 See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith R. 
Masters trans., 1978) [hereinafter ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT]; JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, 
POLITICS AND THE ARTS: LETTER TO M. D’ALEMBERT ON THE THEATRE (Allan Bloom trans., 1960). 
This aspect of Rousseau’s thought is made especially clear in JUDITH N. SHKLAR, MEN & CITIZENS: A 
STUDY OF ROUSSEAU’S SOCIAL THEORY (1969); see also JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 
96–98, 107 (Thomas Burger & Frederick Lawrence trans., 1989). Rousseau approved of censorship 
because, to put the point in the terms of Robert Post, discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 
168–81, he thought that democracy needed extremely strong civility norms to survive and that 
censorship was necessary to maintain this. The teaching of theologically intolerant religion, for 
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realization. Many more people probably value democracy intrinsically just 
because it is their familiar way of life, in the same way they value the 
stories they read as children or the town in which they grew up. Redish has 
succeeded in offering one rationale for free speech. It is not the only 
possible coherent rationale. 
Even if it is stipulated that free speech has a single moral basis, the 
reader must also be willing to accept all the logical implications of that 
moral basis, however distressing they might be. As we shall see, Redish 
endorses the results the Court has reached in the campaign finance and 
tobacco advertising cases.141 Must we follow Redish to these conclusions? 
To see the limitations of his constructivism, consider how he addresses 
a different problem. Redish argues that the value of self-realization is 
logically inconsistent with the regulation of obscenity.142 Self-realization 
entails that “it is not for external forces—Congress, state legislatures, or the 
Court itself—to determine what communications or forms of expression are 
of value to the individual; how the individual is to develop his or her 
faculties is a choice for the individual to make.”143 
But suppose someone—let’s call him Harry144—thinks that people, 
especially young people, can be morally damaged by exposure to obscenity 
and that this justifies censorship. What leverage could Redish have over 
Harry? Redish might claim that Harry is being logically inconsistent if he 
believes in democracy but supports a law that contradicts the premise of 
self-realization. Harry can reasonably respond (1) that he is not committed 
to self-realization in the form that Redish presents, (2) that he is not 
 
example, was a danger to the state: “It is impossible to live in peace with people whom one believes are 
damned.” ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra, at 131. He was mistaken at the level of 
empirical reality, not at the level of high theory. 
For modern writers who think that political self-rule is impossible but that elections can nonetheless 
prevent the worst political abuses, see JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND 
DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950), and Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison’s Vision of the State: A 
Public Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328 (1994). The claim that minority domination is 
inevitable probably cannot be proved or disproved at this high level of abstraction. ROBERT A. DAHL, 
DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 272–74 (1989). 
141 But not, perhaps, the specific result in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). See 
infra note 413. 
142 REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 110, at 68–76; Redish, Commercial Speech, 
supra note 113, at 120. 
143 REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 110, at 69–70. 
144 See HARRY M. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY: CENSORSHIP IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY 
(1969); HARRY M. CLOR, PUBLIC MORALITY AND LIBERAL SOCIETY: ESSAYS ON DECENCY, LAW, AND 
PORNOGRAPHY (1996). The Supreme Court has endorsed a similar view to justify the nonprotection of 
that subset of pornography it deems “obscene.” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973). 
Many Americans share Harry’s view. In 1981, 56% of Americans supported laws against the 
distribution of pornography, whatever the age of the purchaser. It has fallen in recent years, but 31% of 
Americans still held that view in 2010. See IPOLL DATABANK, http://webapps.ropercenter.uconn.edu/
CFIDE/cf/action/ipoll/ (search for “distribution of pornography”) (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) 
(subscription required). 
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committed to democracy in the form that Redish presents, or (3) that there 
are worse things than inconsistency, and the harm caused by obscenity is 
one of those things. Harry may also think that obscenity is not important to 
valuable forms of self-realization. 
Harry could say that the self-realization to which he is committed is 
not the freedom to realize yourself in any way you like, but rather the 
freedom to choose among valuable options. He could say (with Joseph 
Raz145) that there is no value in having the choice of a worthless option or 
(with John Finnis146) that the exercise of practical reason is one among a 
number of goods and is not a sufficient reason to sacrifice those other 
goods. He could say that “where ‘paternalism’ on the part of the political 
community is justified it is, like the educative function of parenthood itself, 
to be no more than a help and support to self-correction and self-
direction.”147 In other words, he could deem self-realization to be oriented 
toward a more specific set of goods than Redish posits, and on that basis 
discern degrees of salience within speech by “draw[ing] lines within the 
area of communicative conduct based on the same criteria.”148 
2. Redish’s Neo-Rawlsian Argument.—If Harry is deemed to be 
correct about obscenity causing harm, then suppressing obscenity could be 
deemed necessary to a compelling state interest.149 But Redish rules this out 
because the suppression of obscenity “grows out of regulatory hostility 
toward the moral and socio-political premises implicitly advocated by the 
obscene communication.”150 The government’s purpose in suppressing 
obscenity is to prevent readers from adopting a relaxed vision of sexual 
mores. There can never be a compelling state interest in viewpoint 
discrimination.151 
 
145 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986). 
146 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980). 
147 Id. at 220. 
148 Farber & Frickey, supra note 105, at 1622. Farber and Frickey think that Redish is inconsistent 
for not thus drawing lines, but Redish is committed to the premise that all speech that aids self-
realization is of exactly the same value. He is consistent. The question is whether he can compel his 
readers to accept this premise. 
149 That is why I have thought it worth taking the trouble to show that he is not correct. See Andrew 
Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1635 (2005) [hereinafter 
Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?]; Andrew Koppelman, Eros, Civilization, and Harry 
Clor, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 855 (2007). The present Article grows out of an argument 
that Professor Redish and I have been having for years over whether the inquiries I pursued in these 
earlier essays could possibly be relevant to First Amendment adjudication. 
150 Redish, Commercial Speech, supra note 113, at 120. 
151 Another argument sometimes made in favor of suppressing pornography is that it incites 
criminal violence against women. The evidence for that proposition is weak. See Koppelman, Does 
Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, supra note 149, at 1663–72. But whether or not pornography incites 
violence does not matter to Redish’s theory: “even if one could conclusively establish some connection, 
regulation would still fail the Supreme Court’s test of temporal imminence.” Martin H. Redish & Gary 
Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The 
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Censorship on the basis of views like Harry’s violates the principle of 
“epistemological humility,” which holds that “no governmental body may 
impose restrictions on expression on the basis of predetermined moral 
values.”152 Free speech must be understood to be a closed system. Allowing 
substantive moral values into free speech doctrine would create “a political 
jungle in which those in power are able to suppress the expression of those 
whose views they find deeply offensive.”153 
Redish’s argument for epistemological humility is explicitly modeled 
on Rawls. “First Amendment choices are necessarily made behind a 
Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’: when choosing a mode of First Amendment 
construction, one cannot know which particular values will be promoted as 
a result.”154 When we establish government, “none of us knows who in 
society will be a part of which moral faction, or which moral faction will be 
more powerful.”155 Therefore, it is rational for us all to agree to disable 
government from suppressing speech in the name of its moral vision. 
But why should the parties behind Redish’s veil of ignorance focus 
specifically on speech as an object of protection? Perhaps they “could 
reasonably decide that speech is less likely to cause direct or immediate 
harm to the interests of others and more likely to develop the individuals’ 
mental faculties than is purely physical conduct.”156 This is Redish’s 
explanation for why speech is appropriately singled out for special 
treatment. But, if the parties are afraid of being tyrannized by other moral 
factions, then speech protection is not adequate to avoid such tyranny. Why 
not ban morals laws altogether, or adopt a Nozickian libertarian state, or 
eliminate the danger of an oppressive state by agreeing to anarchy? Why 
should the parties behind the veil think that their interest in speaking is 
weightier than their interest in avoiding exposure to certain kinds of 
 
Ominous Implications, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 267, 308 (1991). I noted earlier that the Brandenburg test, 
which Redish invokes, rests on contestable evaluative and predictive judgments. See supra text 
accompanying notes 95–96. Redish, however, thinks that the demand for imminence rests on “the logic 
of free speech.” Redish & Lippman, supra. Does he really believe that even if it were conclusively 
proven that women were being assaulted by the millions as a direct result of pornography’s influence, 
we would be required by the logic of free speech to tolerate this result? 
152 MARTIN H. REDISH, THE LOGIC OF PERSECUTION: FREE EXPRESSION AND THE MCCARTHY ERA 
9 (2005) [hereinafter REDISH, LOGIC OF PERSECUTION]; see also REDISH, MONEY TALKS, supra note 
113, at 6 (describing epistemological humility as the principle that no law-restricting speech may 
“presuppose substantive moral truth, untied ultimately to the direct or indirect choices of the 
electorate”). 
153 Redish, Commercial Speech, supra note 113, at 112. Redish frequently makes this rhetorical 
move, raising the stakes of an isolated question so that unless his answer to that question is accepted, 
the entire structure of free speech law will be jeopardized. See infra text accompanying notes 164, 183, 
191, 398, 399, 413, 460. 
154 REDISH, LOGIC OF PERSECUTION, supra note 152, at 183. 
155 REDISH, MONEY TALKS, supra note 113, at 27. 
156 REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 110, at 19 (footnote omitted). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
676 
unwanted speech? Hasn’t Redish presumed that the parties behind the veil 
share his high valuation of freedom of speech?157 
Unlike Redish, Rawls abstracts for moral, not prudential, reasons. For 
Rawls, the reason you and I here and now are interested in the original 
position is that we are trying to devise fair terms of cooperation in which 
morally irrelevant contingencies of fortune play no role.158 That is why the 
parties must be ignorant of their wealth. 
The motives for a prudential, neo-Hobbesian veil of ignorance are 
more contingent than those of Rawls, and so the size and shape of the veil 
should be contingent as well. (Redish often accuses less speech-protective 
theorists of being result oriented, but prudential reasoning is inherently 
result oriented.) The parties can allow themselves to know quite a lot about 
their substantive moral views if they feel reasonably confident that those 
views will continue to prevail in politics. Redish aspires to a kind of 
neutrality among contending political values. Neutrality, however, comes 
in many different forms.159 Consider religious qualifications for public 
office. In 1787, non-Christians were officially barred from public office 
almost everywhere in the United States, and most states barred Catholics as 
well.160 This discrimination was paradoxically a kind of neutrality, as for 
example New Jersey’s 1776 constitution, which made eligible for office 
“all persons, professing a belief in the faith of any Protestant sect.”161 At 
this time in England, no one who was not a member of the Church of 
England could hold public office, and those who denied the Trinity could 
be imprisoned on the second offense.162 American law operated behind a 
veil of ignorance about whether one was Anglican or Baptist, but not about 
whether one was Protestant or Catholic. Americans were afraid of the civic 
exclusion of Protestants. They weren’t much troubled by civic exclusion of 
Jews or atheists. Contemporary American law bars any requirement that 
officeholders believe in God.163 By what prudential argument could the 
 
157 That high valuation is particularly clear in Redish’s treatment of content-neutral restrictions on 
expressive conduct, which he would disallow unless the challenged restriction could be shown to be 
necessary to a compelling government interest. See id. at 87–126. In cases where the interest is 
legitimate but not compelling, the government regulates the challenged conduct for a good reason, but 
the right to speech overrides that reason. What reason could the parties behind the veil have for giving 
such great weight to speech interests as against the interests furthered by the challenged law? 
158 See JOHN RAWLS, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical (1985), in COLLECTED 
PAPERS, supra note 54, at 388, 402–03. 
159 See Koppelman, The Fluidity of Neutrality, supra note 80. 
160 See Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: 
A Machine that Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674, 681–83 (1987). 
161 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC 
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1313 (Ben: Perley Poore comp., Washington, Government Printing 
Office 1877). On the shift toward greater inclusiveness in the American law of religion, see ANDREW 
KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 26–45 (2013). 
162 See URSULA HENRIQUES, RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IN ENGLAND, 1787–1833 (1961). 
163 See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
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Americans of 1787 have been persuaded to go behind a thicker veil of 
ignorance? Their fear that perhaps the atheists would be able to seize office 
and oppress them? Why wouldn’t it be sufficient for them to answer that 
that danger was improbable and that the power they were giving to the state 
seemed to them an important one? 
How much should the parties to the social contract fear the results of 
state disempowerment? Harry thinks that viewpoint neutrality, if construed 
to protect obscenity, will produce enormous harm. Any prudential 
calculation by Harry will take that into account. The same is true of 
commercial speech or campaign spending by corporations. Any prudential 
calculus must take into account the harms that will occur if that speech 
remains unregulated. Perhaps the result will still be protection of speech. 
But a rational consumer will look at an item’s price before buying it. 
Redish claims that his rationale “does not represent a firmly held 
theory of moral epistemology so much as an instrumental construct 
designed to avoid totalitarianism.”164 But totalitarianism is not a real danger 
of every authorization of government to censor in the name of a substantive 
moral vision. The United States has never been as speech protective as 
Redish wants—people continue to go to jail for distributing obscenity165—
yet totalitarianism has been avoided. There may be good reasons for 
objecting to those prosecutions. I think there are.166 But the objection had 
better not be a prediction that we are on an inevitable path to Hitler’s 
Germany. Pornography has been prosecuted for a long time without sliding 
down that slippery slope.167 
3. Post and the Boundaries of Public Discourse.—Consideration of 
Robert Post’s rival theory on public discourse further elucidates the 
limitations of Redish’s theory. Post has his own blind spots, but he 
articulates some of the most important dimensions of free speech that 
Redish neglects. 
More than any other contemporary free speech theorist, Post 
emphasizes the historically situated character of modern free speech law. 
He observes that it cannot be deduced from first principles and that it is not 
even well captured by the rules that the Supreme Court has crafted. 
The free-speech jurisprudence of the First Amendment is notorious for its 
flagrantly proliferating and contradictory rules, its profoundly chaotic 
collection of methods and theories. Yet, strange to say, those fluent in the law 
of free speech can predict with reasonable accuracy the outcomes of most 
 
164 REDISH, MONEY TALKS, supra note 113, at 28. 
165 See Greg Beato, In Defense of Extreme Pornography, REASON.COM (Oct. 27, 2009), http://
reason.com/archives/2009/10/27/in-defense-of-extreme-porn. 
166 See supra note 149; see also Andrew Koppelman, Reading Lolita at Guantánamo: Or, This 
Page Cannot Be Displayed, DISSENT, Spring 2006, at 64. 
167 The basic mistake is treating a slippery slope argument as a logical one, when in fact it is an 
empirical one. See Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985). 
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constitutional cases. It seems that what is amiss with First Amendment 
doctrine is not so much the absence of common ground about how 
communication within our society ought constitutionally to be ordered, as our 
inability to formulate clear explanations and coherent rules capable of 
elucidating and charting the contours of this ground.168 
To Post, the inherent instability of the ideal of public discourse explains 
this incoherence. Public discourse has historically emerged as an 
autonomous sphere that is immune from both government management and 
the norms of particular communities. Within this sphere, democracy is a 
negative ideal; “it must refuse to foreclose the possibility of individual 
choice and self-development by imposing preexisting community norms or 
given managerial ends.”169 This sounds a lot like Redish. But unlike Redish, 
Post thinks that public discourse has a specific, collective goal: “to enable 
the formation of a genuine and uncoerced public opinion in a culturally 
heterogeneous society.”170 
Post observes that there must be a boundary between public and 
nonpublic discourse since not every speech act receives First Amendment 
protection. “[A]ll speech is potentially relevant to democratic self-
governance, and hence according to democratic logic all speech ought to be 
classified as public discourse.”171 That, too, sounds like Redish. But, Post 
notes, we have other commitments beside public discourse, and public 
discourse itself depends on some civility norms. Some considerations have 
considerable weight: material disseminated through mass media is 
presumptively protected,172 and the censorship of those media to foster 
particular communities’ civility rules is presumptively improper.173 But this 
does not yield a clear code. “The many factors relevant to the classification 
of speech as public discourse thus resist expression in the form of clear, 
uniform, and helpful doctrinal rules.”174 
There is a paradox at the boundaries of public discourse: the very 
effort to distinguish public from private matters is already politically 
loaded and presupposes controversial criteria about the proper subject of 
 
168 Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, in 
ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 153, 153 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. 
Stone eds., 2002) [hereinafter ETERNALLY VIGILANT] (footnote omitted). 
169 POST, supra note 109, at 7. 
170 Id. at 145. 
171 Id. at 175. 
172 See id. at 164–73. 
173 See id. at 148–50. 
174 Id. at 173; see also Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. 
REV. 1, 18 (2000) (noting that the “common sense” on which the boundaries of public discourse 
depends is “complex, contextual, and ultimately inarticulate”). Post’s critics complain about this 
vagueness. See LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 139–44 (2005); 
Redish & Lippman, supra note 151, at 302; Redish & Mollen, supra note 109, at 1342–48. But they 
should be disarmed by these statements. Post does not purport to be offering clarity. 
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politics.175 Nonetheless, if there is to be a sphere of public discourse, lines 
must be drawn. 
Post’s anthropology is imperfect even on its own terms. His account of 
public discourse is incomplete because he unduly privileges democracy as 
its basis.176 He has, perhaps, not fully freed himself from constructivism.177 
Democratic legitimation is perhaps one reason why scientific speech is 
protected, but it is not the most salient reason, and it cannot explain the 
protection of instrumental music. Post also cannot explain why private 
conversations are ever protected.178 Truth and self-realization evidently play 
roles that are absent from his account.179 These omissions suggest that 
Schauer was right: we have several different First Amendments, and Post 
has described only one of them. 
Post’s analysis nonetheless poses a challenge to any tunnel 
constructivist free speech theory. Post claims that “[t]he aspiration to be 
free from the constraints of existing community norms (and to attain a 
consequent condition of pure communication) is in tension with the 
aspiration to the social project of reasoned and non-coercive 
deliberation.”180 Rational deliberation presupposes norms of civility. If the 
law cannot sustain these norms, then “public discourse corrodes the basis 
of its own existence.”181 Such paradoxes confound the aspiration to a 
simple deductive theory. They suggest that, as we shall see when we 
examine Milton and Mill, any free speech regime will be justified, not by 
its theoretical elegance (which is not to be had), but by the vibrant public 
discourse it fosters. 
4. Redish and the Boundaries of Public Discourse.—Redish avoids 
Post’s paradox because he thinks the ban on viewpoint discrimination 
prohibits any civility-based restriction on speech.182 An injunction against a 
Nazi march in a town heavily populated by Holocaust survivors, for 
example, would be “normative censorship by those in power,” which is “a 
result wholly inconsistent with the foundations and premises of a 
democratic society.”183 When the point is put that broadly, it necessarily 
 
175 See POST, supra note 109, at 147, 268. 
176 In this, Post agrees with Redish. See Robert C. Post, Viewpoint Discrimination and Commercial 
Speech, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 169, 175 (2007). 
177 Stanley Fish argues that this kind of theoretical tidying up is inconsistent with Post’s 
anthropological method. Stanley Fish, The Dance of Theory, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT, supra note 168, 
at 199, 205. 
178 Redish & Mollen, supra note 109, at 1347–48. 
179 Nor does he discuss the importance of a character ideal, even though that has played a large role 
in developing the ideal of public discourse. 
180 POST, supra note 109, at 147. 
181 Id. 
182 Redish & Lippman, supra note 151, at 292–94, 297–304. 
183 Redish, Commercial Speech, supra note 113, at 113. 
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applies not only in Skokie, but in Berlin and Vienna as well. Nazi speech 
is, of course, censored in Germany and Austria,184 but it does not follow 
that those countries are not democracies.185 Redish must offer some 
evidence that public discourse does not depend on civility norms as Post 
claims. He presents no such evidence, nor any interest in such evidence. 
Since his argument is a pure deduction from democratic theory, there does 
not appear to be any way in which the evidence could matter.186 Rawls 
worried about the stability of liberal institutions.187 Redish takes that 
stability for granted. 
Redish disagrees with Post’s view that hard questions are raised by 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell.188 The case decided a lawsuit for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by Hustler magazine’s 
publication of a parody advertisement portraying an incestuous encounter 
between the Rev. Jerry Falwell and his mother.189 The Supreme Court held 
 
184 See LEGISLATING AGAINST DISCRIMINATION: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION NORMS 328–30 (Nina Osin & Dina Porat eds., 2005) (German statutes); id. at 86–88 
(Austrian statutes); see also BARENDT, supra note 86, at 166–67; Walter F. Murphy, Excluding Political 
Parties: Problems for Democratic and Constitutional Theory, in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, 
PRESENT AND FUTURE—A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 173 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. 
Kommers eds., 1993). 
185 In 1952, 37% of Germans agreed that “it would be better for Germany not to have any Jews in 
the country,” while only 20% disagreed. DAVID ART, THE POLITICS OF THE NAZI PAST IN GERMANY 
AND AUSTRIA 55 (2006). In 1953, 55% of Germans disagreed with the statement that “German soldiers 
of the last war can be reproached for their conduct in the occupied countries.” Id. (Thanks to Susan 
Scarrow for directing me to this volume.) Neither of these questions concerned free speech, but both 
answers are probative of the difficulties of creating a liberal, speech-protective culture in postwar 
Germany. 
Nor is it clear that what legitimates constitutional restrictions on democratic decisionmaking is that 
such restrictions are subject to democratic repeal. See REDISH, MONEY TALKS, supra note 113, at 28. 
First, even in America, constitutional amendment is not possible without surmounting Article V hurdles 
that hamstring the capacity of present majorities to enact their will. For a majoritarian objection to this 
state of affairs, see Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside 
Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988). Second, it is far from clear that some legally permissible 
exercises of that will, such as the reinstitutionalization of slavery, would be consistent with democracy. 
A democracy is, of course, better functioning if respect for individual rights emerges from an 
unfettered electoral process rather than being imposed from above. See COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, 
DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS: THE SUBSTANCE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT 136–59 (2007). But that point does not 
dictate that the German–Austrian approach is wrong, in context. 
186 At one point, however, he responds by shifting the burden of proof to Post: if civility is allowed 
to limit public discourse, “we would suffer concrete, unambiguous limitations on public discourse, 
without any assurance that the sum total would ultimately represent a net gain to public expression.” 
Redish & Lippman, supra note 151, at 300. Redish concedes that it is possible that Post is right and 
simply demands more evidence than Post provides. However, he does not engage with Post’s evidence, 
instead summarily dismissing “the citation of sweeping, wholly unsupported assertions by sociologists.” 
Id. at 294. 
187 See FREEMAN, supra note 60, at 163–66. 
188 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
189 Id. at 48. 
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that the parody was protected because Falwell was a public figure.190 
Redish thinks this was an easy case: a ban on any kind of offensive speech 
violates the prohibition on viewpoint discrimination. Any concession to 
civility rules would “sweep frighteningly far, with no apparent logical 
stopping point to prevent the eventual wholesale destruction of speech 
values.”191 Post notes, however, that the Court limited its holding to the 
abuse of public figures.192 The result might have been different if Hustler, 
for its target, “had picked a private person’s name at random from the 
telephone directory.”193 (Fortunately for Hustler, Falwell’s mother died 
before the advertisement was published; it is far from clear that the Court 
would have reversed if she had been the plaintiff.)194 Redish cannot make 
that concession.195 He aspires to a world where citizens can heap abuse on 
one another with no fear of tort liability. Perhaps protecting Falwell’s 
mother is bad for the community because “squelching speech actually has 
the effect of decreasing inclusiveness in the deliberative project.”196 But 
Redish has shown us no reason to believe that. 
Redish implicitly concedes that public discourse depends on some 
shared public values. In his most recent work, he acknowledges that 
democracy, even a conception of “adversary democracy” that envisions 
endless conflict, presupposes some level of community: a common 
commitment to “the peaceful resolution of disputes and a continuation of 
the commitment to the democratic process.”197 He assumes this 
commitment can be maintained without restricting much speech and that, 
as Post describes the assumption, “community life is constituted by the 
voluntary choices of its members.”198 
Redish’s implicit rejection of Post’s paradox requires evidence about 
what in fact holds liberal communities together. It cannot be deduced from 
democratic theory. The idea that liberal aspirations are all you need to 
maintain community has its attractions—the idea that America stands for 
 
190 Id. at 56–57. 
191 Redish & Lippman, supra note 151, at 302. 
192 POST, supra note 109, at 127. 
193 Id. at 375 n.50. 
194 It may be clearer what the result would be today after Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011), 
which indicated that even private figures may be subjected to this kind of abuse with impunity. 
195 Redish does defend the distinction between public and private figures made in Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), opining that it is reasonable to hold that the “defamation of an 
individual who has voluntarily entered the public arena is more tolerable than similar harm inflicted 
upon one who has assumed no risk.” REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 110, at 81. But he 
has not extended this reasoning to intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
196 Redish & Lippman, supra note 151, at 301 (emphasis omitted). 
197 Redish & Mollen, supra note 109, at 1370; see also id. at 1352, 1354 n.234. This aspect of 
adversary democracy is not discussed in Martin H. Redish & Elana Nightingale Dawson, “Worse than 
the Disease”: The Anti-Corruption Principle, Free Expression, and the Democratic Process, 20 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1053 (2012). 
198 POST, supra note 109, at 138. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
682 
liberty is potent199—but it depends on local conditions.200 Redish is in no 
position to say what democracy requires in Berlin. That weakens his 
authority to describe what democracy entails, even in the United States. 
Redish dismisses Post’s free speech anthropology as irrelevant to 
normative theory,201 but he evidently has, and needs, an anthropology of his 
own. 
The argument for civility norms does not only rest on the paradox of 
public discourse. In part, it also rests on a substantive judgment that, even 
if the community could go on functioning while it tolerates these injuries, it 
should not have to. Falwell’s mother should not have to put up with 
abusive parodies, even if the civic consequences (for everyone else!) of 
subjecting her to them are not especially severe.202 
The same point applies to some racist speech.203 For example, when a 
black customer returns merchandise to a store and is required to sign a slip 
stating, “Arrogant Nigger refused exchange—says he doesn’t like 
products,” is it really necessary that the First Amendment bar recovery for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress?204 It depends on whether there 
exists any category of words “which by their very utterance inflict 
 
199 For a particularly strong and succinct statement of the ideal of a liberal community, see 4 JOEL 
FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING 108–13 (1988). 
Redish sometimes relies on this ideal. Responding to a well-known epigram by Justice Stevens, he 
writes that “we are willing to send our sons and daughters off to war, presumably to protect the right of 
each individual to decide what books he or she will read and what movies he or she will see, free from 
the state’s power to determine that such forms of communication are ‘worthless.’” REDISH, FREEDOM 
OF EXPRESSION, supra note 110, at 72. It is a telling point, but Redish would need to say more than he 
does about the conditions under which this liberal ideal can attract the allegiance of citizens. 
At one point, Redish concedes the interdependent relation of community and individual: 
A vibrant self-governing community cannot function successfully unless individual citizens are 
themselves intellectually active and respected members of that community. Although theorists 
may differ over which is the ends and which is the means, it is clear that individual integrity and 
democratic community are intertwined in a symbiotic relationship. 
REDISH, MONEY TALKS, supra note 113, at 24 (footnote omitted). 
But Redish’s specifications of both individual integrity and democratic community are far vaguer 
and more abstract than Post’s. 
200 Thomas Jefferson famously stated the optimistic thesis in ringing tones: “If there be any among 
us who would wish to dissolve this Union or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed 
as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to 
combat it.” THOMAS JEFFERSON, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in WRITINGS 492, 493 
(Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). Sixty years later, the harmlessness of such views became less obvious. 
201 Redish & Lippman, supra note 151, at 294; Redish & Mollen, supra note 109, at 1333. 
202 This is Justice Alito’s view. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1222 (2011) (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
203 I agree with Redish that most racist speech should be protected in American law, but my 
reasons are more local and contingent than his. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 
AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 220–65 (1996). 
204 The facts are taken from Irving v. J. L. Marsh, Inc., 360 N.E.2d 983, 984 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977), 
which denied recovery, id. at 986. The court did not discuss the First Amendment. 
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injury.”205 It is obvious that such a category exists in lived reality. The 
question is whether the First Amendment permits us to act on that.206 
A similar point can be made about speech in the sphere of 
management. Sometimes the law “organizes social life instrumentally to 
achieve specific objectives,”207 and speech is restricted in the furtherance of 
those ends. One example is the enforcement of professional norms of truth 
and competence: dentists are forbidden to give certain advice to patients 
even if they sincerely believe it to be correct because the state dental 
association regards such advice as false and irresponsible.208 Full protection 
of such speech (which would be fully protected if the dentist published it in 
a book) would sacrifice the legitimate goals of averting harm and 
guaranteeing competent services. In professional–client relations, assuming 
the full autonomy and competence of the patient would be tantamount to 
“masking particularly intolerable conditions of private power and 
domination.”209 Sometimes paternalism, even paternalistic interference with 
speech, makes us freer. And so an understanding of free speech that 
absolutely bars such interference would make us more vulnerable to 
manipulation and abuse and thus less free. 
Redish, however, rejects the idea of speech that is “constitutionally 
regulable per se.”210 It is not clear whether this means all speech should be 
presumptively protected: Redish has never confronted the problem that free 
speech is not even salient with respect to perjury, price-fixing, conspiracy, 
and many other acts requiring words.211 Yet Redish appreciates how 
destructive some speech can be, and so he proposes that free speech rights 
“must give way only in the presence of a truly compelling governmental 
interest.”212 Sometimes, the result will not be very different from the 
categories of speech protection in present doctrine, such as the rules of New 
York Times v. Sullivan and Brandenburg v. Ohio.213 But Redish vehemently 
denies that different levels of speech get different levels of protection. The 
 
205 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
206 Redish quotes this passage of Chaplinsky, but in the ensuing discussion he considers “fighting 
words” as regulable only if they are likely to lead to a disturbance of the peace. See REDISH, FREEDOM 
OF EXPRESSION, supra note 110, at 55–57. Steven Heyman argues that the same rights-based 
conception that supports free speech can also entail protection from some personal abuses, regardless of 
whether they are likely to lead to violence. STEVEN J. HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN DIGNITY 
142–46 (2008). 
207 POST, supra note 109, at 2. 
208 Post, supra note 176, at 171–72. Post uses the example of a dentist’s advice to replace “mercury 
amalgam fillings with gold or composition fillings.” Id. at 171. Most dentists believe that this procedure 
subjects patients to considerable risk for no discernable benefit. 
209 POST, supra note 109, at 284. 
210 REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 110, at 56. 
211 See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of 
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004). 
212 REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 110, at 55. 
213 Id. at 119; see also supra notes 95–105 and accompanying text. 
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same result is accomplished through the prudent calibration of compelling 
state interests. 
I am not persuaded that this reconstruction of doctrine advances 
understanding. In the first place, the flattening of all speech to one level is 
implausible. Farber and Frickey charge Redish with “a radical telescoping 
of values, in which a political dissenter can no longer be distinguished from 
a Mafia boss giving orders to a hit man.”214 This criticism is not fatal 
because constructivism always aims for a radical telescoping of values. It 
abstracts away from ideals, paradigmatically religious ideals, that may be 
deeply felt but must be politically irrelevant. (Rawls claimed that the 
“intuitive idea” of his theory was “to generalize the principle of religious 
toleration to a social form.”)215 But is this particular telescoping what free 
speech requires? Redish, of course, does not really believe that there is no 
difference in the value of a dissenter’s speech and that of the Mafia boss. 
He merely thinks that “epistemological humility” requires that we not draw 
any such distinction for free speech purposes. But as we have seen, the 
neo-Hobbesian argument for such abstinence does not work.216 
Redish’s success in reconstructing so much of free speech doctrine 
unchanged, together with the conceded malleability of his compelling 
interest test,217 suggests that he is trying to preserve his theory in the face of 
substantial evidence to the contrary. Just as you can reconcile the data with 
the Ptolemaic theory that the sun revolves around the Earth so long as you 
are willing to construct complex equations and add some assumptions 
about invisible forces, you can preserve Redish’s free speech theory by 
manipulating the compelling interest test. But these are complicated ways 
to account for phenomena that have much simpler explanations.218 
Redish makes many effective arguments for a broadened conception of 
free speech, and the Supreme Court is coming round to his view. However, 
he misconstrues the source of his own power. His arguments sometimes 
persuade not because they are deductions from unchallengeable premises, 
 
214 Farber & Frickey, supra note 105, at 1623. 
215 RAWLS (1971), supra note 40, at 206 n.6; RAWLS (1999), supra note 40, at 180 n.6; see also 
RAWLS (1971), supra note 40, at 220; RAWLS (1999), supra note 40, at 193. Other proponents of liberal 
neutrality toward ideals of the good have described their project in similar terms. See BRUCE A. 
ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 99 (1984); GERALD F. GAUS, JUSTIFICATORY 
LIBERALISM: AN ESSAY ON EPISTEMOLOGY AND POLITICAL THEORY 170 (1996); CHARLES LARMORE, 
THE MORALS OF MODERNITY 144 (1996). 
216 See supra notes 159–67 and accompanying text. 
217 By a “compelling interest,” he means not a “standard incapable of compliance,” but rather “a 
matter of truly vital and important concern.” REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 110, at 119. 
This will sometimes generate categorical rules, but sometimes it demands ad hoc balancing with a 
“‘thumb on the scales’ in favor of free speech.” Id. at 120. 
218 It is also worth noting that in some cases, the desired result cannot be reached because the Court 
has given different levels of protection to speech in cases where it has said that the state interest is 
exactly the same. See Post, supra note 174, at 29–30. 
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but because they offer considerations, rooted in liberal ideals of autonomy, 
in favor of protection—considerations that must however be weighed 
against (and sometimes really do outweigh) the enormous heterogeneous 
lot of considerations on the other side of any particular question. Redish’s 
own rhetorical appeal itself stands in the tradition we have been describing 
and has unacknowledged roots in the substantive ideals first formulated by 
Milton and Mill. His theory depends on an aspiration to a certain kind of 
independence and power, the free and self-determining individual, which is 
itself quite historically specific.219 
His arguments on behalf of unregulated campaign finance and 
commercial speech, which I’ll discuss shortly, are not deductions from 
unquestionable premises, but appeals to this ideal. Those appeals show that 
such speech is salient for free speech purposes. It does not follow that the 
speech’s salience equals that of other speech or that the state interests 
involved are not stronger here. 
Both Redish and Rawls seek to offer accounts of liberty that are 
insulated from the contingency of contesting political views. Neither can 
completely achieve that insulation because there is no secure Cartesian 
anchor for their arguments. Rawls understands this. Does Redish? 
B. The New Negative Tunnel Constructivism 
In recent years, there has been a second wave of tunnel constructivism. 
Larry Alexander and Stanley Fish have each argued that because no sound 
constructivist account of free speech is possible, free speech theory is a 
misguided project. 
Alexander asks whether free speech can coherently be regarded as a 
human right, by which he means “a moral right that exists apart from any 
particular legal or institutional arrangement.”220 He is looking for “a 
negative liberty right of a deontological, not indirect consequentialist, 
nature.”221 He capably shows that free speech cannot be shown to be such a 
right. Like Redish, he thinks epistemic abstinence is the foundation of free 
speech, but unlike Redish, he thinks such abstinence is impossible.222 Any 
speech theory must be founded on substantive moral commitments. 
 
219 Charles Taylor observes that the modern tendency to privilege radical choice, unconstrained by 
any source of value outside the act of choice itself, arises from a description of the human situation in 
which there is a plurality of valid moral visions that are impossible to adjudicate. This gives rise to a 
specifically modern ideal of authenticity. “Granted this is the moral predicament of man, it is more 
honest, courageous, self-clairvoyant, hence a higher mode of life, to choose in lucidity than it is to hide 
one’s choices behind the supposed structure of things, to flee from one’s responsibility at the expense of 
lying to oneself, of a deep self-duplicity.” CHARLES TAYLOR, What is Human Agency?, in 
1 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE 15, 33 (1985). 
220 ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 3. 
221 Id. at 6. 
222 Id. at 147. 
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Alexander infers that judges have no business enforcing most of 
contemporary free speech law because the case for doing so is too 
speculative.223 But perhaps judges should protect free speech because 
speech is a value worth protecting, and the courts are, at least in this 
department, less untrustworthy than the other branches of government.224 
Alexander concludes that “[t]here is no human right of freedom of 
expression,” even though he concedes that “[t]here are many good reasons 
for governments not to regulate expression for the purpose of affecting 
messages.”225 This way of putting it presumes that human rights are made 
out of some material other than good reasons. The reasons to allow 
expression “will always be limited, local, and based on hunches about 
consequences.”226 But across a broad range of cultural circumstances, it is 
good, perhaps even morally urgent, to grant a legal right to free speech. A 
human right need not be more elevated than that.227 
Stanley Fish similarly claims that “there is no such thing as free 
speech” because any argument for free speech must state the purpose of a 
speech-protective regime, and once that purpose has been specified, “it 
becomes possible to argue that a particular form of speech, rather than 
contributing to its realization, will undermine and subvert it.”228 Fish’s 
point is devastating if and only if free speech cannot tolerate exceptions or, 
more generally, if liberalism must present itself as viewpoint neutral, “the 
principle of a rationality that is above the partisan fray.”229 If liberalism is a 
substantive position that can frankly acknowledge itself as such, then Fish’s 
objections lose their force. 
 
223 Id. at 185–93. 
224 The best exposition of this argument is still Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of 
the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 896–99, 903–07 (1963). The claim is a contingent one, and it 
was not true for most of American history. Until the mid-twentieth century, popular culture was often 
supportive of free speech claims, while courts were overwhelmingly hostile. See generally CURTIS, 
supra note 89; LEVY, supra note 87; RABBAN, supra note 86. Today, on the other hand, courts are 
routinely presented with cases in which some legislative actor has repressed speech in ways that are 
clearly impermissible under judicially crafted law. See Adam Winkler, Free Speech Federalism, 
108 MICH. L. REV. 153 (2009). 
225 ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 193. 
226 Id. 
227 James Griffin, for example, argues that human rights are tools devised to protect persons in their 
capacity as agents who can choose and pursue a conception of the good life. Among those tools are the 
basic necessities of life and liberty from unwarranted interference. See JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS (2008). Free speech, although Griffin barely mentions it, might merely be a tool of this kind. 
Similarly, Jeremy Waldron suggests that “an argument counts as right-based just in case it takes the 
moral importance of some individual interest as a reason for assigning duties or imposing moral 
requirements.” JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 25 (1988). 
228 STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO 13–
14 (1994). 
229 Id. at 137. 
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Fish understands this perfectly well. I do not take Fish to disagree with 
the thesis of this Article. On the contrary, he states it nicely: “Speech . . . is 
never a value in and of itself but is always produced within the precincts of 
some assumed conception of the good to which it must yield in the event of 
conflict.”230 Like me, he argues that any defense of free speech must follow 
the model of Milton’s Areopagitica.231 His book’s title, There’s No Such 
Thing as Free Speech and It’s a Good Thing, Too, is a silly caricature of 
his position, but it is so provocative that evidently he couldn’t resist using 
it. 
Fish’s great weakness as a free speech theorist is that he is so obsessed 
with refuting, over and over again, the pretensions of tunnel constructivism 
that he never gets around to saying what the actual modern practice of free 
speech is, why it is valuable, or how the law ought to promote it. That 
practice, as it happens, consists in significant part of protecting the 
expression of views that we substantively reject, such as racism. There are 
excellent reasons for doing this that have nothing to do with tunnel 
constructivism, but Fish is blind to them.232 In that sense, his title is 
accurate: there is no such thing as free speech between the covers of his 
book. 
These skeptical views depend on the assumption that free speech 
discourse must rest on constructivist deduction. Until the 1970s, however, 
defenses of free speech weren’t done that way at all. 
IV. FREE SPEECH AS A PRACTICE 
A. Healthy, Robust Debate 
Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin observe that in contemporary 
philosophy there is a deep conflict between “two very different accounts of 
ethics and morality: one that seeks eternal, invariable principles, the 
practical implications of which can be free of exceptions or qualifications, 
and another, which pays closest attention to the specific details of particular 
moral cases and circumstances.”233 Jonsen and Toulmin are proponents of 
the latter approach, which they find in the medieval tradition of casuistry. 
There is, they think, no “ethical algorithm”234 that can provide definitive 
answers to moral questions. Rather, the locus of moral certitude, to the 
 
230 Id. at 104. That conception of the good may, however, be one that incorporates free speech as an 
integral part. (As we shall see, Milton and Mill are examples.) Even in such a case, the value of free 
speech is unlikely to override all other considerations. 
231 Id. at 102–04. 
232 The closest Fish comes to endorsing any judicial test for First Amendment protection is an 
approving citation of Learned Hand’s lamentable opinion in United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 
(2d Cir. 1950), aff’d, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See FISH, supra note 228, at 127. 
233 JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 74, at 2. 
234 Id. at 7. 
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extent it exists, lies in a “shared perception of what [is] specifically at stake 
in particular kinds of human situations.”235 Persuasive moral argument is 
less likely to be a deduction from inescapable premises than a rich 
description of the specific situation at hand. 
Ethics, according to Jonsen and Toulmin, is less like logic than it is 
like clinical medicine. Medical practice is in part dependent on a general 
scientific knowledge of diseases and their treatment. But it also depends on 
the capacity to recognize specific syndromes and to reason by analogy from 
past cases to the present problem. “[A]ll diagnostic conclusions are 
tentative and open to reconsideration if certain crucial symptoms or 
circumstances have been overlooked or the later course of the illness brings 
important new evidence to light.”236 
Medical judgments are teleological; they are oriented toward the end 
of health.237 Medicine is a result-oriented, value-laden enterprise because 
“health” is a contested concept. Sickness is deviancy from a norm, but the 
norm is not given by nature. The “blight” that strikes corn is labeled a 
disease because humans want the corn crop to survive; otherwise we would 
just talk about the competition between two species.238 Health is simply a 
 
235 Id. at 18. 
236 Id. at 42. 
237 Here I follow Alasdair MacIntyre, who defines a “practice” as: 
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which 
goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those 
standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, 
with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and 
goods involved, are systematically extended. 
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 187 (2d ed. 1984). Practices, as 
MacIntyre understands them, don’t have essences; they have histories. 
“A practice,” MacIntyre observes, “involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules as well 
as the achievement of goods. To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those standards and 
the inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them.” Id. at 190. Those standards of excellence 
can be virtues: “A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to 
enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively 
prevents us from achieving any such goods.” Id. at 191 (emphasis omitted). 
The practice of free speech as I describe it in this Article is historically situated within the liberal 
tradition. However, MacIntyre thinks that understanding the historical context entails skepticism: 
“[E]ach tradition . . . is unable to justify its claims over against those of its rivals except to those who 
already accept them.” ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 348 (1988) 
[hereinafter MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?]. Liberalism itself, he claims, is a tradition in precisely this 
predicament. Id. at 335. “[N]o tradition can claim rational superiority to any other.” Id. at 348. 
However, one need not go that far to accept MacIntyre’s description of how traditions operate and his 
characterization of liberalism as a tradition. That liberalism is a tradition does not mean we cannot 
discuss its merits. But we must know how liberal practice operates before we can ask whether its ends 
are appropriately universalized. 
238 See RONALD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLITICS OF 
DIAGNOSIS 183–86 (rev. ed. 1987). 
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desirable state of affairs.239 To take a lately familiar example in the area of 
human health, new treatments, such as Viagara and Cialis, have been 
devised to address age-related male sexual dysfunction. Prominent people 
as different as Hugh Hefner and Robert Dole enthusiastically endorse these 
treatments.240 The treatments presuppose, however, that sexual function is 
something that is desirable in the aging male. Plato’s Republic reports a 
conversation in which someone asked the tragedian, “Sophocles, how are 
you in sex? Can you still have intercourse with a woman?” Sophocles 
reportedly responded, “Silence, man . . . . Most joyfully did I escape it, as 
though I had run away from a sort of frenzied and savage master.”241 The 
“dysfunction” was to Sophocles no disease at all. 
There is no way to settle the dispute between Sophocles and Hefner. It 
turns on fundamentally different conceptions of a good human life. (If you 
are not moved by this example, consider contemporary disagreements 
about how the psychiatric profession should address homosexuality.) The 
disagreement does not mean that it is impossible to have a coherent 
practice of medicine. But it does mean that the purposes of medicine cannot 
be deduced from first principles, and neither can the appropriate treatment 
for any particular patient.242 The actual practice of medicine will be 
embedded in a way of life with distinctive values. 
This shift in conceptions of health shows that Jonsen and Toulmin’s 
call for a revival of casuistry fails to describe an important element of 
situation-specific practical reason. Assessment of particular situations will 
depend on the diagnostician’s values. These values will be uncontroversial 
only to the extent that those who assess the diagnostician’s work share his 
world view.243 
 
239 See Dominic Murphy, Concepts of Disease and Health, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/health-disease/. 
240 See, e.g., Bryce Traister, Academic Viagra: The Rise of American Masculinity Studies, 52 AM. 
Q. 274, 285, 302 n.24 (2000); Brooks Barnes, The Loin in Winter: Hefner Reflects, and Grins, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2009, at A1 (late edition). 
241 1 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 329c, at 5 (Allan Bloom trans., 2d ed. 1991). 
242 Aristotle’s methodological warning is pertinent here: 
Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of, for 
precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the 
crafts. . . . We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premisses to 
indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most 
part true, and with premisses of the same kind, to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same 
spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be received; for it is the mark of an educated man 
to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is 
evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from 
a rhetorician demonstrative proofs. 
ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. I.3, at 2–3 (J.L. Ackrill & J.O. Urmson eds., David Ross 
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (c. 384 B.C.E.). 
243 As MacIntyre explains, “each theory of practical reasoning is, among other things, a theory as to 
how examples are to be described, and how we describe any particular example will depend, therefore, 
upon which theory we have adopted.” MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?, supra note 237, at 333. 
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Freedom of speech, and specifically the construction of constitutional 
rules that protect it, is a practice much like medicine. It aims to preserve a 
system of public discourse that facilitates the realization of the goods 
internal to the practice and to protect it from pathologies that impair its 
proper operation. As in medicine, however, what counts as the “proper 
operation” of the pertinent system can only be determined by reference to 
value judgments. 
The values that free speech serves are mutually reinforcing. Self-
realization, democracy, and free speech all support one another. Rich 
community life, individual autonomy, and scientific advancement are 
likewise reasons to support free speech.244 As with health, the goal of the 
practice is a complex of goods. 
I cannot foster an appreciation of the value of this practice, however, 
with a series of deductions from first principles. Instead, I must say, with 
Bernard Shaw, “I do not address myself to your logical faculties, but as one 
human mind trying to put himself in contact with other human minds.”245 I 
need to make you appreciate the substantive attractiveness of the kind of 
community that I am trying to create, a community that tolerates a broad 
range of expression. This is a problem less of logic than of rhetoric.246 
Addressing this rhetorical problem was the aim of every major defender of 
free speech before the constructivists. 
Free speech is a distinctive cultural formation that developed at a 
particular point in history. It is not a necessary implication from 
democracy, the search for truth, autonomy, or anything else. It is a political 
ideal, with roots in the Protestant Reformation, aimed at particular qualities 
of character among citizens and a particular type of institution of public 
discourse. 
As with medicine, the conception of healthy discourse shifts over time. 
The rhetorical power of any defense of free speech depends on its audience 
accepting the normative attractiveness of the defense’s animating ideals. 
 
MacIntyre is right only if he means “theory” broadly to include any framework for understanding what 
matters in human life. Most people engage in practical reasoning and thereby display what they think is 
most important to them, while remaining innocent of “theory” as it is practiced in philosophy 
departments and law schools. See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE 
MODERN IDENTITY 21 (1989). MacIntyre and Taylor disagree about how serious a problem this is. See 
Alasdair MacIntyre, Critical Remarks on The Sources of the Self by Charles Taylor, 54 PHIL. & 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 187 (1994). 
244 Farber & Frickey, supra note 105, at 1640. 
245 BERNARD SHAW, The New Theology (1907), reprinted in THE PORTABLE BERNARD SHAW 304, 
305 (Stanley Weintraub ed., 1977). 
246 Robert Tsai documents in detail the ways the Supreme Court has used rhetoric and metaphor to 
justify the development of a robust law of free speech in his impressive book Eloquence and Reason. See 
TSAI, supra note 111. It is also likely that the self-serving claims of opportunistic legal and political 
actors explain some of the free speech terrain. See Schauer, supra note 211; Frederick Schauer, First 
Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT, supra note 168, at 175. 
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These ideals compete with other desiderata that are no less worthy of 
attention or allegiance. This idea is similar to the context-specific “practical 
reason” advocated by Farber and Frickey, though I emphasize that this 
reasoning is to be employed in the construction of rules that will govern 
future cases, rather than a particularistic judgment in every case.247 Redish 
objects that Farber and Frickey do not “explain how one actually goes 
about attempting to resolve a specific case on the basis of practical 
reason,”248 and concludes that their approach “free[s] a reviewing court 
from the bonds of reason, consistency, and predictability that inherently 
characterize principled decision making”249 and “ultimately amounts to a 
form of non-rational subjectivism and intellectual chaos.”250 The only way 
to answer Redish’s claim that there is no coherent alternative to tunnel 
constructivism is to show that such an alternative exists and that it can 
produce a workable and speech-protective regime. 
There are, of course, many human practices that treat like things alike 
but that cannot be reduced to algorithms: medicine is not merely 
nonrational subjectivism and intellectual chaos. But is it possible for free 
speech protection to be like medicine in this respect? To show that it is, I 
will examine the tradition of speech-protective argument that thrived for 
more than 300 years before the advent of constructivist theories. 
I will begin with an analysis of the classic defenses of free speech by 
Milton and Mill, early American practice, and brief but very influential 
discussions by Justices Holmes and Brandeis. I will then consider the most 
prominent free speech theorist of the 1960s, Thomas Emerson, and other 
leading theorists from that period. None of these authors are constructivists, 
and all embrace substantive political and moral goals in ways that 
constructivists would find anathema. The tradition shows that it is possible 
to have a robust defense of free speech that is not at all constructivist. 
B. Milton 
The earliest articulation of the ideal of free speech,251 in which the 
basic elements are already visible, is John Milton’s 1644 pamphlet 
Areopagitica. In 1641, during the struggles leading up to the English civil 
war, Parliament abolished the Court of Star Chamber. Until then, one 
 
247 See Farber & Frickey, supra note 105, passim. For criticism, see Redish, Commercial Speech, 
supra note 113, at 96–106, and Schauer, supra note 106, at 398 n.3. 
248 Redish, Commercial Speech, supra note 113, at 99. 
249 Id. at 101. 
250 Id. at 105. 
251 I agree with John Durham Peters that the call to tolerate speech that articulates evil ideas for the 
sake of a greater good was present much earlier in Socratic dialogue, Jewish Torah study and Talmudic 
commentary, and the epistles of St. Paul. None of these texts, however, attempted anything like the 
creation of a legal doctrine that protects speech. See PETERS, supra note 102, at 29–67. Milton, on the 
other hand, addresses state actors and calls for a reform of the law. 
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needed a license from the Star Chamber to publish legally. The Chamber’s 
abolition was primarily aimed at depriving King Charles I of his most 
potent means of exercising arbitrary power over his adversaries. An 
unintended side effect was the removal of all restrictions on printing: “The 
immediate result was a flourishing of political and religious ideas the likes 
of which England had never before experienced. . . . By one count, the 
number of pamphlets published during the year 1640 was 22; in 1642, it 
was 1,966.”252 
In August 1642, Charles I gathered his troops at Nottingham for the 
coming war against Parliament. Fighting began in October.253 Parliament, 
concerned about royalist propaganda, its own unity, and also about the 
proliferation of heretical religious opinions, decided to reinstitute licensing 
in June of 1643. It was this licensing law that elicited Milton’s protest. 
Milton developed a positive account of the benefits of free speech, 
which redounded to both the individual and society in reciprocal fashion. 
Protestant assumptions—assumptions that continue to influence modern 
thought about free speech—pervaded Milton’s account of those benefits. 
At the core of Milton’s account rested a Christian ideal of individual 
perfection. This ideal rested on a distinct conception of virtue as the ability 
to face and overcome temptation. It demanded that each person grasp 
religious truth inwardly, not just by outward show. The truth that was to be 
pursued also had distinctive characteristics: it was permanently elusive and 
would emerge over time as a consequence of the collision of opposing 
ideas in a regime of unfettered discourse. Roman Catholicism’s core error 
was the idea that truth was fixed once and for all, and that it could be 
advanced by blind allegiance to authority. 
This ideal of individual perfection led in turn to a distinct conception 
of society. Human society was to be understood as unified not by 
unanimity concerning any particular proposition, but rather by the common 
will to pursue truth together. The benefits of truth thus attained greatly 
outweighed any harms caused by error, and, in fact, error itself contributed 
to the emergence of truth. Because what drove the whole program was a 
vision of the goods achievable through discourse, that vision did not entail 
the limits of the tolerable, and, in fact, Milton offered little explanation for 
drawing the line where he did. 
Milton’s theology is key to understanding his claims about free 
speech. He radicalized the Protestant insistence on the unmediated 
communion between man and God. Even correct religious doctrine could 
not deliver salvation if it was the consequence of blind conformity rather 
than active engagement with religious questions: “A man may be a heretic 
in the truth; and if he believe things only because his pastor says so, or the 
 
252 Vincent Blasi, Milton’s Areopagitica and the Modern First Amendment 2–3 (Yale Law Sch. 
Occasional Papers, Paper No. 6, 1995), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/yale/ylsop/papers/6. 
253 CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE CENTURY OF REVOLUTION, 1603–1714, at 95 (2d ed. 1980). 
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Assembly so determines, without knowing other reason, though his belief 
be true, yet the very truth he holds becomes his heresy.”254 
Religious salvation was to be achieved only by struggle against 
temptation. “Assuredly we bring not innocence into the world, we bring 
impurity much rather: that which purifies us is trial, and trial is by what is 
contrary.”255 Traditionally, the crucifixion was the central event in Christian 
history, but for Milton the great moment was Christ’s rejection in the desert 
of Satan’s temptations.256 It follows that “all opinions, yea errors, known, 
read, and collated, are of main service and assistance toward the speedy 
attainment of what is truest.”257 
The truth does not need state assistance to prevail: 
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so 
Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to 
misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth 
put to the worse, in a free and open encounter.258 
The state, moreover, is likely to err in deciding what ideas to restrict: 
“[I]f it come to prohibiting, there is not aught more likely to be prohibited 
than truth itself; whose first appearance to our eyes bleared and dimmed 
with prejudice and custom, is more unsightly and unplausible than many 
errors . . . .”259 Although coercion can prevent errors, it cannot produce 
 
254 JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica, in COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE 716, 739 (Merritt Y. 
Hughes ed., 1957) (1644) [hereinafter MILTON, Areopagitica] (footnotes omitted). 
255 Id. at 728. 
256 The rejection of Satan’s temptations is the subject of JOHN MILTON, Paradise Regained, in 
COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE, supra note 254, at 470 (1671). 
257 MILTON, Areopagitica, supra note 254, at 727. Paradise Lost likewise emphasizes the 
importance of a free choice between good and evil. JOHN MILTON, Paradise Lost, in COMPLETE POEMS 
AND MAJOR PROSE, supra note 254, at 207, 260 (1674) [hereinafter MILTON, Paradise Lost]. The 
speaker is God the Father, explaining why it was right to allow the rebel angels and, later, Adam to 
transgress: 
Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell. 
Not free, what proof could they have giv’n sincere 
Of true allegiance, constant Faith or Love, 
Where only what they needs must do, appear’d, 
Not what they would? what praise could they receive? 
What pleasure I from such obedience paid, 
When Will and Reason (Reason also is choice) 
Useless and vain, of freedom both despoil’d, 
Made passive both, had serv’d necessity, 
Not mee. 
Id. bk. III, ll. 102–11, at 260. 
258 MILTON, Areopagitica, supra note 254, at 746 (footnote omitted). 
259 Id. at 748. Censors are also likely to be incompetent because no intelligent person will want 
their jobs. Id. at 734–35. A few years later, Milton assumed the responsibility of a licenser himself, but 
he evidently dispensed licenses liberally, at one point citing his argument in Areopagitica, and as a 
result he was relieved of these duties. See GORDON CAMPBELL & THOMAS CORNS, JOHN MILTON: LIFE, 
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virtue, and “God sure esteems the growth and completing of one virtuous 
person more than the restraint of ten vicious.”260 Orthodoxy in doctrine is 
not important. What matters is not outward conformity, but adherence to 
the inner light. Coercion can only produce “the forced and outward union 
of cold and neutral and inwardly divided minds.”261 On the other hand, the 
pluralism that toleration would produce is not a bad thing; “those 
neighboring differences, or rather indifferences . . . whether in some point 
of doctrine or of discipline . . . though they may be many, yet need not 
interrupt ‘the unity of spirit,’ if we could but find among us the ‘bond of 
peace.’”262 
In an England in which speech is unrestricted, “there of necessity will 
be much arguing, much writing, many opinions; for opinion in good men is 
but knowledge in the making.”263 But all this division is superficial, 
concealing “one general and brotherly search after truth.”264 Truth is not a 
static thing that can be possessed once and for all. “Truth is compared in 
scripture to a streaming fountain; if her waters flow not in a perpetual 
progression, they sicken into a muddy pool of conformity and tradition.”265 
Even religious division is a religious good. “[T]here must be many schisms 
and many dissections made in the quarry and in the timber, ere the house of 
God can be built.”266 This united effort will bring about historical progress, 
the completion of the great Protestant revolution: “[T]here be pens and 
heads there, sitting by their studious lamps, musing, searching, revolving 
 
WORK, AND THOUGHT 247–48 (2008); BLAIR WORDEN, LITERATURE AND POLITICS IN CROMWELLIAN 
ENGLAND: JOHN MILTON, ANDREW MARVELL, MARCHAMONT NEDHAM 242–43 (2007). 
260 MILTON, Areopagitica, supra note 254, at 733. 
261 Id. at 742. 
262 Id. at 747–48; see also MILTON, Paradise Lost, supra note 257, bk. III, ll. 183–97, at 262–63, 
where the “sincere intent” of prayer is a lot more important than its content: 
Some I have chosen of peculiar grace 
Elect above the rest; so is my will: 
The rest shall hear me call, and oft be warn’d 
Thir sinful state, and to appease betimes 
Th’ incensed Deity while offer’d grace 
Invites; for I will clear thir senses dark, 
What may suffice, and soft’n stony hearts 
To pray, repent, and bring obedience due. 
To Prayer, repentance, and obedience due, 
Though but endeavor’d with sincere intent, 
Mine ear shall not be slow, mine eye not shut. 
And I will place within them as a guide 
My Umpire Conscience, whom if they will hear, 
Light after light well us’d they shall attain, 
And to the end persisting, safe arrive. 
263 MILTON, Areopagitica, supra note 254, at 743. 
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new notions and ideas wherewith to present, as with their homage and their 
fealty, the approaching reformation . . . .”267 
Individual dignity, a major theme in modern free speech 
constructivism, plays a limited role in Milton’s argument. For an author to 
be compelled to bring his work “to the hasty view of an unleisured licenser, 
perhaps much his younger, perhaps far his inferior in judgment, perhaps 
one who never knew the labor of book-writing,” and to then “appear in 
print like a puny with his guardian . . . cannot be but a dishonor and 
derogation to the author, to the book, to the privilege and dignity of 
learning.”268 But this is a decidedly secondary theme, and it is closely 
linked to a claim about state incompetence. 
The argument as a whole depends not just on Protestantism, but on 
Milton’s peculiarly latitudinarian Protestantism. Christopher Hill observes 
that Milton’s theology rests on a radical Arminianism, in which salvation is 
available to all men who believe and is in no way dependent on the formal 
ceremonies of Catholicism or of the Anglican Church.269 In sacraments as 
Milton understands them, “it is the attitude of the recipient that matters, not 
the ceremony.”270 This radical individualism is connected with a range of 
heretical religious views, many of them idiosyncratic to Milton.271 
Prominent among these idiosyncratic beliefs is the priesthood of all 
believers: anyone with a gift for making the Word of God known should be 
free to disseminate it.272 Milton’s defense of free speech depends crucially 
on these religious views.273 If you do not share those views, he will not 
move you. 
Milton does not propose to abolish all viewpoint-based restrictions on 
publication. His free speech theory contains no epistemological humility or 
veil of ignorance. “I mean not tolerated popery and open superstition, 
which, as it extirpates all religions and civil supremacies, so itself should 
be extirpate . . . that also which is impious or evil absolutely, either against 
faith or manners, no law can possibly permit, that intends not to unlaw 
itself . . . .”274 But it is not clear why he draws the line here. Was Milton 
convinced that there was a Catholic conspiracy to enslave England?275 Did 
he think that the Catholics, because they did not themselves believe in (and 
 
267 Id. at 743 (footnote omitted). 
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indeed aimed to subvert) toleration, were therefore not entitled to it?276 Did 
he think that Catholic speech was not about a matter reasonably in doubt 
and so could not contribute to the advancement of truth?277 Was tolerance 
only for the “neighboring differences” of those committed to 
Protestantism?278 Did Milton simply betray his own principles?279 It is 
impossible to know. Because the aim is to create a certain kind of society, 
and because speech is instrumental to that end, there is no way to deduce 
the limits of toleration from first principles. The kind of free speech theory 
that focuses first on the boundaries of protection is not Milton’s concern. If 
he can convince his audience, the members of Parliament, to share his 
social vision, then the boundaries of protection can be left to their 
discretion. 
C. Mill 
Mill’s argument in his 1859 book On Liberty contains all of the 
elements just described in Milton, standing in a similar relationship to one 
another. However, the foundation is different: the Christian idea of 
salvation through faith has been replaced by a Romantic ideal of 
authenticity. But the moves are recognizably Milton’s.280 Most importantly, 
they are equally teleological. Mill does not reason from first principles. He, 
like Milton, has a vision of individual perfection within a good society and 
proposes rules calculated to realize that vision. 
The liberty that Mill defends encompasses “liberty of expressing and 
publishing opinions,” but also “liberty of tastes and pursuits, of framing the 
plan of our life to suit our own character, of doing as we like, subject to 
such consequences as may follow, without impediment from our fellow 
creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they 
should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong.”281 The protection of 
speech is an exception to his principle that the state may interfere with 
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281 MILL, supra note 111, at 71. 
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liberty only to prevent harm to others: almost all speech is protected even 
when it is harmful. But the exception is embedded within the same 
commitments that generate the broader protection of liberty. 
The reason for this broad liberty is an ideal of individuality. God is 
absent from that ideal—here is the fundamental difference between Milton 
and Mill—but every individual still has an obligation to respond to an 
inwardly felt calling, which if courageously pursued will bring him closer 
to the ultimate good. Free speech and freedom of conduct are valuable 
because they smooth the path toward this good.282 
Like Milton, Mill places enormous value upon the ability to face and 
overcome temptation. Society needs “open, fearless characters.”283 His 
argument that truth is likely to emerge from the collision of ideas is 
familiar, but much more than Milton he relies on the experience of the 
scientific revolution (though Milton does augment his case against 
censorship by recalling his visit with Galileo, then under house arrest in 
Italy).284 Like Milton, Mill cares about the capacity to grasp truth inwardly, 
not just by outward show. He values “the clearer perception and livelier 
impression of truth produced by its collision with error.”285 If the reasons 
for even a true opinion are held without understanding the arguments both 
for and against it, “it will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth.”286 As 
in Milton, a man may be a heretic even in the truth.287 Truth held 
dogmatically “is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the 
words which enunciate a truth.”288 The pursuit matters more than the 
attainment: “Truth gains more even by the errors of one who, with due 
study and preparation, thinks for himself than by the true opinions of those 
who only hold them because they do not suffer themselves to think.”289 
Again like Milton, he uses a military metaphor290 to describe the struggle he 
wishes to elicit: “Both teachers and learners go to sleep at their post as soon 
as there is no enemy in the field.”291 
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Independence of character is valuable in itself: 
 It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in 
themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the limits imposed 
by the rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and 
beautiful object of contemplation; and as the works partake the character of 
those who do them, by the same process human life also becomes rich, 
diversified, and animating, furnishing more abundant aliment to high thoughts 
and elevating feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds every individual 
to the race, by making the race infinitely better worth belonging to.292 
As John Durham Peters observes, Mill’s ideal of character is an 
unstable mix of Stoicism and romanticism. As listeners, citizens must be 
willing to subject their dearest beliefs to challenge and criticism, and learn 
to articulate views the opposite of their own. Yet as speakers, they must 
present their ideas powerfully and with conviction.293 
The valuable traits of character promoted by a regime of free speech 
have a negative counterpart in the malign effects of censorship. “The 
greatest harm done is to those who are not heretics, and whose whole 
mental development is cramped and their reason cowed by the fear of 
heresy.”294 The consequence is “a low, abject, servile type of character,”295 
and Mill bombards it with nasty metaphors: automatons in human form, 
apes, cattle, sheep. He even borrows Milton’s metaphor of a “stagnant 
pool.”296 Alan Ryan observes that On Liberty “does not so much lay out 
logically compelling arguments as depict a type of character to which one 
can react favourably or unfavourably.”297 
As in Milton, the truth is permanently elusive and will emerge over 
time as a consequence of the collision of opposing ideas in a regime of 
unfettered discourse. “The exclusive pretension made by a part of the truth 
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to be the whole must and ought to be protested against . . . .”298 Progress is 
nonetheless possible: “As mankind improve, the number of doctrines which 
are no longer disputed or doubted will be constantly on the increase; and 
the well-being of mankind may almost be measured by the number and 
gravity of the truths which have reached the point of being uncontested.”299 
Like Milton, Mill also stresses the likely incompetence of state 
authorities. Censorship of opinion presumes an infallibility to which the 
state is not entitled. Even when it interferes with conduct rather than 
speech, “the odds are that it interferes wrongly and in the wrong place.”300 
Liberty of conduct, treated in a different section of On Liberty than 
freedom of speech, rests on the same foundation. Liberty of conduct is 
good for one’s character; it also has collective benefits because it makes 
important information available to mankind. Mill’s call for “experiments of 
living”301 is not merely a metaphor; it is offered in a scientific spirit. Mill 
thinks it possible to make progress with respect to values as well as facts: 
mankind can discover higher pleasures that, once known, will be preferred 
to the lower ones.302 “[T]he only unfailing and permanent source of 
improvement is liberty, since by it there are as many possible independent 
centres of improvement as there are individuals.”303 Developed human 
beings are of use to the undeveloped primarily because “they might 
possibly learn something from them.”304 Even action that brings “great 
harm to the agent himself” is beneficial to others because, “if it displays the 
misconduct, it displays also the painful or degrading consequences which, 
if the conduct is justly censured, must be supposed to be in all or most 
cases attendant on it.”305 This is why “[m]ankind are greater gainers by 
suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves than by 
compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.”306 
Finally, also like Milton, Mill’s account of the limits of the tolerable 
does not purport to be deductive. Opinions lose immunity 
when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute 
their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act. An opinion 
that corn dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, 
ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may 
justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled 
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before the house of a corn dealer, or when handed about among the same mob 
in the form of a placard.307 
How is a court to tell what constitutes a “positive instigation”? The fact that 
bad conduct is a probable result of the speech? (The Supreme Court 
adopted that test for a while, with lamentable results.)308 Or something more 
speech protective, such as clear and present danger, advocacy of actual law 
violation, or something like the Brandenburg test? Mill does not say. He is 
as vague as Milton about the boundary. It is not his central concern. Like 
Milton, he tries to create a kind of society and to coax the reader to see its 
appeal. The creation of appropriate rules of law is ancillary to his project. 
D. Milton and Mill Compared 
There are major structural similarities between the arguments of 
Milton and Mill. An ideal of individual perfection, consisting of personal, 
inwardly felt connection with a source of value that is not reducible to any 
formula or received set of behaviors, lies at the core of both theories. The 
good toward which the individual strives is dynamic and ever changing, 
demanding a corresponding dynamism from the individual. Individual 
virtue, then, consists of the ability and the courage to weigh alternatives. 
One facet of this virtue is the capacity to discern truth, a truth that one can 
only progress toward in an asymptotic process that never ends. The 
collision of ideas helps the individual in this task by forcing him to 
confront his real range of choices. 
Both also have a vision of communal life driven by the need to 
facilitate the realization of this individual ideal. Society’s task is to foster 
conditions of experimentation and debate that make it likely that the 
individual will engage in the necessary moral confrontation. Even errors 
are valuable, and their dissemination should be tolerated because they help 
to promote such confrontation. Individual struggles produce benefits for 
society, both in the advancement of truth and the discovery of new and 
better ways of living. The social unity both Milton and Mill envision 
depends on a general understanding of the way in which liberty promotes 
self-development, the core ideal for both theorists. 
Their ideals of self-development are culturally specific, though neither 
Milton nor Mill would likely have seen this. Milton’s ideal depends on his 
radical Protestantism. Mill’s relies on his peculiar combination of 
romanticism and stoicism. Neither embraces anything so abstract as truth, 
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democracy, or self-realization, but both have specific ideas of how freedom 
ought to be exercised. 
Alan Haworth, who has also noted the similarities between 
Areopagitica and On Liberty, thinks that the very different context in which 
Mill writes weakens his reformulation of Milton’s argument. “Milton gains 
sharpness by keeping his target restricted”309: he argues against licensing, 
not against all silencing of discussion. When Milton argues that speech 
advances truth, he only considers moral truth, the knowledge of right and 
wrong. He is right that licensers have no legitimate claim to superior 
understanding about that. However, Mill tries to generalize the point into 
areas of discourse where it is less clearly correct. Milton’s argument 
against taking ideas on trust also makes more sense in the context of 
Protestant religion than it does with respect to the rest of human knowledge 
where such trust is indispensable in ordinary life. 
Haworth’s objections do not undermine Mill so much as make his 
claims more diffuse. Mill’s power comes from his distinctive ideal of the 
human person, not from any particular argument.310 As with Madison, when 
Milton’s arguments are displaced from their original context, they lose 
some of their logical power but continue to articulate a set of commitments 
about which speech should be tolerated. 
Milton and Mill both offer attractive responses to certain inescapable 
tendencies of modernity. That is the source of their enduring appeal. In 
modern societies, individuals typically live in a plurality of lifeworlds, in 
which family life, work life, and political life involve vastly different, often 
discrepant meanings and experiences. Ideologies of pluralism legitimate 
this experience.311 Given the extent to which the individual must 
continually refashion his social identity, the right to freely plan and shape 
one’s own life becomes salient because it is rooted in the fundamental 
structures of modern society.312 
Milton and Mill are both important and influential theorists of free 
speech, but you will doubtless have noticed that both are English. How 
have Americans thought about free speech? 
E. The American Tradition 
From the beginning, there were two American approaches to free 
speech: an orthodox legal view that construed the liberty narrowly as 
merely freedom from prior restraints, and a popular free speech tradition 
that was far more speech protective. The popular tradition is invisible in the 
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cases: “To the extent that a popular free speech tradition helped to prevent 
repressive legislation, it left no court decisions or statutes.”313 But it was an 
important part of American discourse. It went beyond prior restraints and 
repudiated the idea that speech could be suppressed whenever it 
encouraged bad conduct. It was not a well-developed account of the 
boundaries of protected speech, but it did provide the principal reason why 
free speech was a well-established practice.314 The antebellum South, where 
antislavery speech was increasingly repressed, remained an exception to 
the popular tradition. Precisely because popular culture valued free speech, 
the North denounced this repression. 
This pattern—popular support for free speech, combined with 
repressive courts—continued until the mid-twentieth century. By the late 
1800s, free speech had become an important element of libertarian 
radicalism and the first scholarly defenses of free speech appeared.315 These 
writers remained marginal, having no influence on the courts and little on 
the larger culture. The popular tradition occasionally led state actors to 
adopt rules much like the ones we have today, but those rules were neither 
embedded in any larger theory nor judicially enforced to invalidate 
legislation.316 
The absence of a theory can be regarded as a problem. Zechariah 
Chafee complained that in the nineteenth century free speech was not given 
any specific legal content.317 Alexander Bickel responded that it is better 
that legal doctrine never be forged in the first place because “law can never 
make us as secure as we are when we do not need it. Those freedoms which 
are neither challenged nor defined are the most secure.”318 
One can see fragments of the Milton–Mill ideal in the epigrammatic, 
highly influential early twentieth-century formulations of Justices Holmes 
and Brandeis, the wellspring of modern judicial protection of speech. When 
Holmes invokes “the competition of the market”319 as a test for truth, he 
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invokes both the scientific revolution rationale and, implicitly, the idea of a 
dynamic, agonistic society, heavily inflected by the influence of the 
pragmatists and Darwin.320 A distinctive character ideal and the fear of a 
blindly repressive society animate Brandeis’s claims that “courage” is “the 
secret of liberty” and his claim, dense with images and metaphors, that 
it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds 
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; 
that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed 
grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil 
counsels is good ones.321 
Both Holmes and Brandeis are too brief and conclusory to be 
constructivist, and the specific legal tests they proposed have been 
discarded. But their statements of free speech ideals have endured. 
Alexander Meiklejohn may seem to offer a more constructivist 
approach, declaring that freedom of speech is “a deduction from the basic 
American agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal 
suffrage.”322 As his critics have noted, however, Meiklejohn’s pretensions 
to deduction are a sham. His work is full of undefended assumptions about 
the appropriate scope of the political agenda and the nature of political 
freedom, and the boundary he draws between protected and unprotected 
speech is notoriously conclusory and indeterminate.323 No court could 
administer it as a rule, even if it wanted to. What he really offers is a 
bold—in context, heroic—rhetorical intervention in a repressive political 
environment, masquerading as a deductive argument.324 His main 
achievement lies in stating reasons why speech that advocates the 
overthrow of the government, the speech of Communists, has political 
value and should be protected. In the United States, the power to suppress 
such speech was used throughout Meiklejohn’s career to repress legitimate 
dissent, almost always from the political left, and thereby to deprive the 
electorate of legitimate political choices.325 Meiklejohn fought the good 
fight, but he was not a constructivist. 
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F. Emerson 
The title of Thomas Emerson’s Toward a General Theory of the First 
Amendment,326 which is one of the most cited law review articles on free 
speech,327 is often taken to aim at a constructivist theory.328 However, the 
article actually offers a set of general value commitments, relevant to but 
not dispositive of a broad range of free speech problems, together with a 
description of the environment in which those values are to be realized. His 
aim, he says, is to analyze 
(I) what it is that the first amendment attempts to maintain: the function of 
freedom of expression in a democratic society; (II) what the practical 
difficulties are in maintaining such a system: the dynamic forces at work in 
any governmental attempt to restrict or regulate expression; and (III) the role 
of law and legal institutions in developing and supporting freedom of 
expression.329 
He articulates multiple speech values without assigning priority to any 
one of them. Speech is valuable for individual self-fulfillment, to advance 
the discovery of truth, to provide for participation in decisionmaking, and 
to achieve a more adaptable community. No deeper foundations are stated. 
The theory of freedom of expression “comprehends a vision of society, a 
faith and a whole way of life.”330 
Emerson then anatomizes, at some length, “the powerful forces that 
impel men toward the elimination of unorthodox expression.”331 He 
undertakes a rich sociological and institutional description of contemporary 
America, which he takes to be the indispensable predicate of the 
protections he advocates. Those forces are illustrated by the history of 
speech suppression in America, notably the period of the Alien and 
Sedition laws, the restrictions of World War I, and the restrictions that 
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had free speech as its central focus was Bork, supra note 44, (tied for number twenty-four) which very 
slightly outranked it with four more citations. By 1996, Bork had risen to number seven and Emerson 
had declined to thirty-three. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 751, 768 (1996). 
328 Thus, for example, Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away 
from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212 (1983), makes clear that 
Emerson is one of his targets. See id. at 1283. By “theory,” however, Shiffrin means constructivism: 
“high level abstractions that dictate results in all or most concrete cases.” Id. at 1254. It is anachronistic 
to attribute this kind of theory to Emerson, but Shiffrin’s assumption that this must be what Emerson 
was trying to do is revealing because it shows how pervasive the assumption had become by 1983 that 
any free speech theory must be constructivist. 
329 Emerson, supra note 224, at 878. 
330 Id. at 886; see also THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7–8 
(1970). 
331 Emerson, supra note 224, at 887. 
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followed World War II.332 It is because those forces are so powerful that 
there must be a strong commitment to the right to free expression, and any 
exceptions to protection “must be clear-cut, precise and readily 
controlled.”333 
Emerson thus argues for rigid speech-protective rules, not because 
they are logical deductions from his premises, but because recent memory 
shows that the existing law of free speech is too weak to afford the 
protection that is necessary if the goods of a free society are to be realized. 
The rules he proposes are crafted with that experience in mind. The four 
purposes of free speech that he lays out are not premises from which he 
deduces anything. They are values that the reader should keep in mind 
when evaluating his proposals. His proposals are cobbled together 
instrumentally, in a spirit of problem solving rather than logical inference. 
Judges are authorized to implement these proposals merely because their 
exercise of discretion is more trustworthy than that of the legislative and 
executive branches of government.334 In this there is a huge gap between 
Emerson and the later writers who seize one of the values he lays out and 
make it the major premise of a constructivist theory. 
The analogy to the practice of medicine illuminates why Emerson 
organizes his article as he does. Before you can be a doctor, you need to 
(1) understand what constitutes health, (2) have a detailed factual 
description of the situation that presents obstacles to its attainment, and 
from these (3) devise a provisional plan for treatment, revisable in light of 
experience. Emerson offers (1) a statement of free speech ideals, (2) a 
description of the environment in which free speech is endangered, and 
(3) proposed rules to address the dangers. No wonder constructivists were 
impatient with Emerson. 
Emerson leaves some important matters vague. The doctrinal structure 
he proposes is crude. Schauer observes that “if a number of diverse values 
are served by the First Amendment, it would seem more likely that an 
equally diverse doctrinal structure would result.”335 Emerson gives no 
explanation for the diminished protection of commercial speech.336 He 
makes protection of all kinds of speech dependent upon a potentially 
misleading distinction between “expression” and “action,” the labels 
suggesting that protection turns on something intrinsic in the “essential 
qualities”337 of the communication that puts it on one or the other side of 
 
332 See id. at 891–93. 
333 Id. at 889. 
334 See id. at 896–99, 903–07. On the limited validity of this claim, see supra note 224. 
335 Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment, supra note 135, at 313. 
336 See Redish, Commercial Speech, supra note 113, at 97. 
337 Emerson, supra note 224, at 917. Any search for such “essential qualities” is delusory because 
there are no such essential qualities. Stanley Fish correctly observes that “insofar as the point of the 
First Amendment is to identify speech separable from conduct and from the consequences that come in 
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the line. But the distinction as he implements it turns on a purely 
consequentialist judgment, “a question of whether the harm attributable to 
the conduct is immediate and instantaneous, and whether it is irremediable 
except by punishing and thereby preventing the conduct.”338 On this basis, 
for example, he concludes that defamation of private figures,339 undesired 
publicity,340 and perhaps even publication of information that might 
prejudice a fair trial341 is “action.”342 Emerson does not consider the limits 
of First Amendment salience at all: he has nothing to say about the 
exclusion of, for example, contract law, which consists almost entirely of 
visiting unwanted consequences on persons because of words that they 
have said.343 Certain kinds of speech are particularly salient for Emerson, 
evidently, because those kinds of speech are necessary to achieve the ends 
that he valorizes. We have discovered distinctive goods of discourse that 
make sense in our time and place. We need rules that will preserve this 
sphere of discourse. The weakness of Emerson’s theory is that his tools 
were too crude for the job as he himself conceived it. In short, Emerson 
“attempts to put too much of a diverse phenomenon into too sparse a 
doctrinal structure.”344 
As late as the mid-1960s, there was no constructivist theory of free 
speech. Consider two other leading writers.345 Harry Kalven’s The Negro 
 
conduct’s wake, there is no such speech and therefore nothing for the First Amendment to protect.” 
FISH, supra note 228, at 106. For further analysis of the incoherence of the distinction, see REDISH, 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 110, at 201–04; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 825–32 (2d ed. 1988); Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally 
Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted 
Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277 (2005). 
338 Emerson, supra note 224, at 917. 
339 Id. at 922. 
340 Id. at 927. 
341 Id. at 925. 
342 In his later discussion in The System of Freedom of Expression, Emerson again describes the 
issue as presenting the (incoherent) question: “which element is predominant in the conduct under 
consideration. Is expression the major element and the action only secondary? Or is the action the 
essence and the expression incidental?” EMERSON, supra note 330, at 80. In the discussion that follows, 
however, he focuses instead, much more sensibly, on an entirely distinct issue: whether the 
government’s purpose in restricting any particular conduct is to curtail expression. See id. at 80–90. The 
Court itself has taken a similar line, holding that restrictions on communicative conduct are permissible 
“if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.” United States v. 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). Emerson denounces the O’Brien test, but his real concern is that the 
Court misapplied it in that case: “it is apparent that governmental control was directed at prohibiting the 
expression in draft card burning, not at punishing the action.” EMERSON, supra note 330, at 84. 
343 See Schauer, supra note 211. 
344 Schauer, supra note 106, at 410. 
345 Another prominent work is Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE 
L.J. 1424 (1962), which argues strongly against ad hoc balancing in favor of rules. He says little about 
how the rules are to be derived, except to endorse the argument of Meiklejohn. See id. at 1449 n.105. If 
Meiklejohn is no constructivist, see supra text accompanying notes 322–25, then neither is Frantz. 
Thanks to Steven Shiffrin for calling my attention to this article. 
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and the First Amendment346 contains only close critical readings of cases, 
with no overarching theoretical framework.347 Alexander Bickel’s treatment 
of speech issues in The Least Dangerous Branch is similarly case 
specific.348 In his last work, perhaps reacting to the early emergence of free 
speech constructivism, he flatly repudiates the idea that the First 
Amendment is a “coherent theory that points our way to unambiguous 
decisions.”349 
V. INSTITUTIONS AND CHARACTER IN THE SYSTEM OF  
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Milton, Mill, Holmes, Brandeis, Emerson, and Post all articulate the 
imperatives of the emerging category of public discourse. All are, in 
different ways, consequentialist, describing the good results that discourse 
will produce. The label “consequentialist” may, however, obscure the fact 
that no consequence is self-evaluating: all these writers work in a cultural 
milieu in which those results count as good. All are ideologists of an 
emerging practice.350 All would agree with Owen Fiss that freedom of 
speech refers to “a social state of affairs, not the action of an individual or 
institution.”351 
The elements of a healthy realm of public discourse are multiple and 
mutually reinforcing. Much recent scholarship has identified values of free 
speech in addition to those enumerated by Emerson.352 These works have 
often been criticized as inadequate or partial accounts of the purpose of free 
speech, but they are better understood as descriptions of single elements of 
the cluster. Schauer’s hypothesis, that we have several different First 
Amendments, has already been noted. This Part considers how they fit 
together. 
The sphere of public discourse has many interlocking elements in 
addition to speech-protective rules of law. I here consider them in two 
 
346 HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965). 
347 The contingencies and doctrinal embarrassments of New York Times v. Sullivan are discussed, 
with no attempt or even inclination to clean them up with an elegant theory, in id. at 52–64; see also 
Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First 
Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191. For a shrewd assessment of Kalven’s ambivalence toward grand 
theory, see Schauer, supra note 106. 
348 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS 51–55, 88–100, 149–50, 232–34 (1986). 
349 BICKEL, supra note 318, at 57. 
350 Here I use the term “practice” in MacIntyre’s sense. See supra note 237. MacIntyre, though not 
a friend of liberalism, has recognized a distinct set of communal goods promoted by the toleration of 
conflicting points of view. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Toleration and the Goods of Conflict, in 2 ETHICS 
AND POLITICS: SELECTED ESSAYS 205 (2006). 
351 OWEN M. FISS, Free Speech and Social Structure, in LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER 7, 15 (1996). 
352 See supra text accompanying note 330. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
708 
broad categories: the institutional framework and the character of 
individuals. 
With respect to the institutional element, Jürgen Habermas’s historical 
analysis of the emergence of the public sphere is helpful. In Europe, 
beginning late in the seventeenth century, a new set of institutions 
developed—newspapers, literary salons, coffeehouses, novels, and works 
of art criticism—separate from both the state and private civil society. 
These institutions generated a new sphere of public reason that became the 
basis for criticizing both. Printedness took on a new cultural meaning, 
implying a new mode of societal integration resting on the common use of 
reason, through discourse addressed to a broad and impersonal audience.353 
Habermas’s later work is less historical and more abstract, elaborating 
on the norms he thinks implicit in the practice of discourse. For example, 
he claims that when people engage in communicative action, they “must 
commit themselves to pragmatic presuppositions of a counterfactual sort,” 
notably “that the participants pursue their illocutionary goals without 
reservations, that they tie their agreement to the intersubjective recognition 
of criticizable validity claims, and that they are ready to take on the 
obligations resulting from consensus and relevant for further interaction.”354 
From these abstract premises, Lawrence Solum deduces a doctrine of free 
speech that privileges speech aimed at the consensual coordination of 
action, as opposed to speech that merely attempts to manipulate its 
audience.355 
The Habermas–Solum approach begins to look like another 
constructivism. Habermas’s theory aims to reconstruct actual practice, and 
Solum aims to similarly reconstruct free speech doctrine. But the 
abstraction of Habermas’s later theory obscures the historical specificity of 
any particular public sphere. Habermas’s public sphere is an ideal type 
subject to a broad range of possible elaborations.356 Habermas’s early work 
excessively idealized the discourse of the eighteenth century and overstated 
the novelty of modern pathologies.357 
 
353 See HABERMAS, supra note 140. 
354 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 4 (1996). For elaboration, see JÜRGEN 
HABERMAS, Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification, in MORAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 43–115 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber 
Nicholsen trans., 1990). 
355 Lawrence Byard Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment 
Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 96–97, 111–13 (1989). 
356 Peters observes that its ideal–typical character is exaggerated by the neologism “public sphere” 
in the translation of Habermas’s book, which aims to explain the origins of what in German was an 
ordinary and familiar political term. John Durham Peters, Distrust of Representation: Habermas on the 
Public Sphere, 15 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOCIETY 541, 543–44 (1993). 
357 See the critical essays and Habermas’s response in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Craig 
Calhoun ed., 1992). Craig Calhoun also observes that Habermas almost completely neglects the internal 
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The community of participants, for example, may be more exclusive 
than Habermas hopes. He optimistically assumes that it includes everyone 
in the polity, but Michael Warner has shown how the audience for books 
and newspapers in early America was primarily white, male, and upper 
class. Indeed, printing was one of the markers that constituted a specifically 
white community.358 A lively debate took place among Southern white 
Americans in the late nineteenth century over the proposal to 
disenfranchise black citizens. The proposal was adopted.359 
The norms of the community, defined in this exclusionary way, can 
place limits on permissible viewpoints. The democratic imperative to bond 
citizens together so that the losers in majority voting nonetheless retain 
allegiance to the polity can create “an all-but-irresistible pull to build the 
common identity around the things that strongly unite people, and these are 
frequently ethnic or religious identities.”360 In the limiting case, “the logic 
of democracy can become that of ethnic cleansing.”361 Or milder incursions 
on rights: Community ideals may underwrite speech limitations, such as 
bans on blasphemy and pornography.362 
Another key parameter is how media shapes the public discourse.363 
An inchoate public realm exists whenever speech is composed for an 
audience of strangers: it is implicitly present in Homer. Different media 
imply different audiences. Contrast cheap paperback editions with 
expensive hardcovers.364 The Internet implies a still different public. 
Shifts in the medium of public discourse can have both positive and 
negative effects for the multiple values of free speech. The Internet, for 
example, makes it far cheaper to disseminate information, but also guts 
revenue sources for newspapers and has decimated their newsgathering 
staffs.365 Vincent Blasi long ago noted the “need for well-organized, well-
financed, professional critics to serve as a counterforce to government—
 
organization of the public sphere: “the power relations, the networks of communication, the topography 
of issues, and the structure of influence.” Craig Calhoun, Introduction to id. at 1, 38. 
358 See MICHAEL WARNER, THE LETTERS OF THE REPUBLIC: PUBLICATION AND THE PUBLIC 
SPHERE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 12 (1990). 
359 See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 67–109 (3d rev. ed. 1974). 
360 Charles Taylor, Modes of Secularism, in SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS 31, 46 (Rajeev 
Bhargava ed., 1998). 
361 Id. at 48. 
362 See POST, supra note 109, at 89–116. 
363 On the impact of media on thought, see also RICHARDS, supra note 110, at 167–68. 
364 That is why English censors often were willing to tolerate expensive but not cheap editions of 
erotically charged classics like Boccaccio and Balzac. See IAN HUNTER ET AL., ON PORNOGRAPHY: 
LITERATURE, SEXUALITY AND OBSCENITY LAW 75 (1993). 
365 See Eric Alterman, Out of Print: The Death and Life of the American Newspaper, NEW 
YORKER, Mar. 31, 2008, at 48. 
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critics capable of acquiring enough information to pass judgment on the 
actions of government.”366 Those critics are disappearing. 
The state can shape public discourse by means that have nothing to do 
with the censorship that concerns First Amendment law. For example, 
Christianity spread quickly because the Roman Empire guaranteed that 
travelers could journey safely between cities. The press in the early 
American republic depended heavily on the federal policy of preferential 
mailing rates for newspapers.367 The shape of public discourse would be 
very different without copyright law. 
Finally, the values promoted by public discourse depend on ongoing 
institutional practices. The truth-promoting rationale for free speech, for 
example, rests on the paradigm of scientific inquiry; this rationale would be 
far less persuasive were there not an ongoing practice of such inquiry. 
Literature, too, exists in concrete institutional forms that presuppose an 
audience that shares, or can be made to share, aesthetic judgments. Free 
speech protects art only because, and to the extent that, judges perceive art 
as valuable. The bounds of perceived value shift over time. Constitutional 
protection of pornography might not exist had not writers such as Lawrence 
and Joyce undertaken to merge two genres, the educative and the erotic 
novel, which previously had coexisted in absolutely distinct channels of 
distribution.368 
The Supreme Court occasionally (without admitting it) gives 
constitutional weight to the distinctive function of institutions, such as 
public television stations, the National Endowment for the Arts, the legal 
profession, universities, and media corporations.369 There is reasonable 
controversy over whether doctrine would be better served by expressly 
incorporating these institutional categories. The healthy operation of this 
infrastructure of free speech should be taken into account at least at the 
architectonic level. 
But the public sphere consists of more than institutions. The public 
sphere demands that the people have certain distinctive traits of character. 
Literacy is only the beginning. Citizens need to be predisposed to make the 
 
366 Blasi, supra note 51, at 541. 
367 See RICHARD B. KIELBOWICZ, NEWS IN THE MAIL: THE PRESS, POST OFFICE, AND PUBLIC 
INFORMATION, 1700–1860s (1989); Anuj C. Desai, The Transformation of Statutes into Constitutional 
Law: How Early Post Office Policy Shaped Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 671 
(2007). 
368 See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 364, at 92–134. 
369 See Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the 
Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273 (2008); Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, 
Biases, and Institutions in the First Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2003); Frederick Schauer, 
Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1747 (2007); Frederick Schauer, 
Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1998); Frederick Schauer, 
Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256 (2005). 
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effort to hear and understand what is said.370 The practice of free speech 
also includes a character ideal, which continues to have elements first 
articulated by Milton and Mill. Vincent Blasi has observed that free speech 
incorporates a complex set of virtues: 
inquisitiveness, independence of judgment, distrust of authority, willingness to 
take initiative, perseverance, courage to confront evil, aversion to simplistic 
accounts and solutions, capacity to act on one’s convictions even in the face of 
doubt and criticism, self-awareness, imagination, intellectual and cultural 
empathy, resilience, temperamental receptivity to change, tendency to view 
problems and events in a broad perspective, and respect for evidence.371 
One particularly valuable trait is the capacity to tolerate opposing views. 
By “carving out one area of social interaction for extraordinary self-
restraint,” Lee Bollinger observes, the free speech regime helps to “develop 
and demonstrate a social capacity to control feelings evoked by a host of 
social encounters.”372 The social benefits of a free speech regime include 
“the spirit of compromise basic to our politics and the capacity to distance 
ourselves from our beliefs.”373 
The free speech tradition concerns itself especially with protecting and 
promoting dissent.374 Obviously, dissent checks the abuse of government 
power.375 The principal source of Blasi’s enumerated character effects is the 
environment created by free speech, in which “dissent is both an option and 
an inescapable reality.”376 People develop these traits by habitually coping 
with views with which they disagree, in an atmosphere in which it is safe to 
hold heretical views. 
Since Milton, the ideology of free speech has celebrated the ability to 
encounter evil ideas and come away unscathed. John Durham Peters writes: 
“Satan represents a key figure in the dramatis personae of free expression, 
the troublemaker who nonetheless brings about, by the very force of his 
 
370 See David Braddon-Mitchell & Caroline West, What Is Free Speech?, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 437 
(2004). 
371 Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character, supra note 321, at 84. There is a rich literature on the 
importance of education for democratic citizenship. See, e.g., EAMONN CALLAN, CREATING CITIZENS: 
POLITICAL EDUCATION AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1997); AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 
(rev. ed. 1999); STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A 
MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY (2000). 
372 BOLLINGER, supra note 323, at 10. 
373 Id. at 141. Redish’s hostile response to Bollinger shows that he rejects the whole idea of 
designing the free speech regime in order to promote traits of character. “[T]he use of free speech 
protection as a means of fostering right thinking,” Redish writes, is “an obvious form of mind control.” 
Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Thought as Freedom of Expression: Hate Crime Sentencing 
Enhancement and First Amendment Theory, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1992, at 29, 34. 
374 See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA (1999); 
SHIFFRIN, supra note 43. 
375 See Blasi, supra note 51. 
376 Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character, supra note 321, at 84. 
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negativity, good in the end.”377 Pornographers, Nazis, and other 
transgressors of the sacred thus form a stable alliance with civil 
libertarians. This valorization of “sponsoring study-abroad sojourns in the 
land of fire and brimstone” is peculiar.378 Most “cultures do not train souls 
for the ironic contortionism that liberal subjectivity calls for.”379 Rather, 
most of the world’s population “cannot hear certain things without wanting 
to hit somebody.”380 Free speech is a distinctive cultural formation, and 
those who would maintain it had better know what it is that they are 
maintaining. 
It is thus an oversimplification to say that the practice of free 
expression can be derived from a few simple principles. The traditional 
goals of free speech—the advancement of truth, the protection of 
democracy, the facilitation of individual autonomy and self-realization—
are elements of a broader pattern of action. The practice has multiple parts, 
like the organs of a body. And as with a body, it is a mistake to focus on 
only one function, such as respiration or nutrition, because health is more 
than that one function. Nor will it do simply to say that there are multiple 
purposes of free speech.381 Understanding the importance of respiration, 
nutrition, and the other functions isn’t enough to qualify a doctor. It is 
necessary to understand how the whole system works and which 
interventions are likely to have which consequences for the system. 
The job of courts is to devise rules that protect the integrity of this 
field of activity while giving appropriate weight to the whole range of other 
interests that can conflict with free speech values. Sometimes this produces 
contestable compromises.382 
Because free speech is a historical cultural formation, the goods 
associated with it have developed over time in unpredictable ways. If free 
speech is a right, it is so for the reasons delineated by Scanlon: “limits on 
the power of governments to regulate expression are necessary to protect 
our central interests as audiences and participants, and we believe that such 
 
377 PETERS, supra note 102, at 84. 
378 Id. at 14. 
379 Id. at 93. 
380 Id. 
381 Joshua Cohen characterizes free speech as derived from a few fundamental interests 
(expressive, deliberative, and informational) and then notes as the basis for rights government’s 
tendency to underprotect these interests. See Joshua Cohen, Freedom, Equality, Pornography, in 
JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE IN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 99 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 
1996); Joshua Cohen, Freedom of Expression, in TOLERATION: AN ELUSIVE VIRTUE 173 (David Heyd 
ed., 1996). 
382 This is emphatically not an argument for abandoning rules and attempting ad hoc balancing in 
each case. For reasons amply shown by Emerson and many others, that kind of balancing is likely to 
yield inadequate protection for speech. 
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limits are not incompatible with a healthy society and a stable political 
order.”383 
Compare the game of baseball. There are many good things about 
baseball, but some are late developments. For example, some baseball fans 
enjoy radio call-in shows that focus on the sport.384 And there may even be 
some for whom this has become one of the main attractions of the game. 
Yet this development was unforeseeable when the modern game of 
baseball was invented in the mid-1800s, long before the invention of the 
telephone and the radio. In some ways, the point is similar to the question 
whether the right is prior to the good. With respect to free speech, the good 
is prior to the right: the goods achievable by the practice of free speech are 
the reason for protecting speech, and the protection should be shaped with 
those goods in mind. Because these goods have no necessary priority over 
other goods, however, censorship in the name of nonspeech goods (e.g., 
obscenity laws) cannot be ruled out a priori on a theoretical level. The 
promised goods achieved by censorship must be engaged with one at a 
time.385 
That the practice of free speech is embedded within local cultural 
values does not mean that there is no leverage with which to criticize 
existing rules of law for being insufficiently protective of speech.386 
Obscenity law, for example, is inadequate for achieving its own deepest 
purposes; the burden it imposes on speech is unjustified even on its own 
terms.387 Nonprotection of “fighting words” might be justifiable in theory, 
but in practice it has almost always been used inappropriately to punish 
criticism of public policy, often directed at police officers.388 The power of 
the Federal Communications Commission to demand “fairness” in 
broadcasters’ coverage of politics was in fact abused to suppress dissenting 
views.389 Child pornography law has drifted so far from its original 
purposes that it now creates a climate of orthodoxy and fear in which 
 
383 Scanlon, supra note 116, at 536. 
384 Professor Redish is well-known among many Chicagoans who listen to such shows as the 
frequent radio caller, “Marty from Highland Park.” Steven Shiffrin points out in conversation that 
fantasy baseball has transformed the game for many fans. 
385 One might generate a formalized account of free speech that begins with these goods and virtues 
and their institutional entailments, and then attempt to deduce rules from these. Such a model, if it could 
be sustained, would be in some sense constructivist, but it would not be tunnel constructivist unless it 
ignored consequences. Here I share the skepticism of JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 74, about an 
ethical algorithm, but I cannot prove there isn’t one. I just have not seen one yet. Thanks to Bruce 
Ackerman and Samuel Freeman for pressing me on this point. 
386 Ian Shapiro articulates an analogous concern about Michael Walzer’s embedded social 
criticism, which also aims at preserving culturally contingent norms. SHAPIRO, supra note 38, at 55–88. 
387 See Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, supra note 149. 
388 See Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531 (1980). 
389 See THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST 
PROGRAMMMING (1994); Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, “Chilling” the Internet? Lessons from 
FCC Regulation of Radio Broadcasting, 4 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 35 (1998). 
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parents are warned not to photograph their children in the bathtub.390 That 
orthodoxy, the tendency “to speak and perhaps to think and feel by 
permission,”391 is the antithesis of the virtues of character that free speech 
aims to foster. 
Free speech, we are often told, is a basic human right.392 Human rights 
claims generally assert that a given right is so important, either because 
having it is necessary to the right holder’s autonomy or because the right 
holder has an urgent interest in its being guaranteed, that it must be 
respected. The invocation of abstract rights such as free speech captures 
their importance but can obscure their inevitable cultural and institutional 
complexity. Their deployment against authoritarian governments, for 
example, can distract attention from the importance of living in a 
democratically accountable regime.393 Once an interest is deemed important 
enough to be a right, we must ask what is required in order to guarantee it. 
Universal rights cannot be understood without examining their instantiation 
in particulars. Any articulation of universal rights must rest on an 
understanding of the comparative histories of different cultural and 
institutional forms. It cannot be done by abstract reasoning alone. 
Rights are not merely abstentions by government. Many rights entail 
institutions. A right to a fair trial, for example, presupposes a properly 
functioning judicial system. A right to marry is unintelligible if rights are 
merely negative liberties. A right to health care presupposes all the 
institutions of modern medicine (a culturally specific practice the universal 
appeal of which is obvious). Property rights depend on reliable state 
enforcement of standardized forms of ownership and also on a widespread 
ethos of respect for the property of others.394 
 
390 See Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 921 (2001). The anxieties it 
provokes have also led to the judicially approved, indefinite detention of persons who have never 
molested children because they had the wrong kind of fantasies. See Rachel Aviv, The Science of Sex 
Abuse, NEW YORKER, Jan. 14, 2013, at 36. 
391 George Kateb, The Freedom of Worthless and Harmful Speech, in LIBERALISM WITHOUT 
ILLUSIONS: ESSAYS ON LIBERAL THEORY AND THE POLITICAL VISION OF JUDITH N. SHKLAR 220, 235 
(Bernard Yack ed., 1996). 
392 A good recent articulation is HEYMAN, supra note 206. Heyman claims that the same principles 
that justify free speech also justify other rights such as privacy and reputation, and that speech is 
appropriately limited only by the rights of other people. This sensitivity to the effects of speech means 
that Heyman is no tunnel constructivist. Nonetheless, his analysis obscures important complexities: the 
hard problems of free speech adjudication do not always involve a collision of rights. Heyman thinks 
that there is no way to resolve clashes between rights and social interests and that his approach avoids 
this incommensurability. But he several times finds it necessary to bring government interests back in, 
and so he recharacterizes them as rights with no gain in clarity. See id. at 41–42 (“community rights”), 
122 (“the government’s responsibility to protect national security”), 130 (“the community’s right to 
govern itself and to implement the laws adopted through the democratic process”). 
393 See SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010). 
394 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1849 (2007). To be legitimate, property rights also depend on everyone having some. See generally 
WALDRON, supra note 227. 
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Free speech is in some ways even more complex than property 
because it includes aspirations both to be a certain kind of person and to 
live in a certain kind of society. These aspirations have cross-cultural 
attractions, but because in any given formulation they inevitably will be 
tightly integrated with other ideals, they will necessarily take culturally 
specific forms (as was the case, we have seen, with Milton and Mill). The 
demand for a right to free speech is a demand that one’s regime include a 
cluster of this kind. The elements of the cluster need to be brought into 
equilibrium with one another in a way that does justice to the aspiration as 
a whole—a project, we shall see, that has implications for the three cases 
we considered at the beginning of this Article. Delineating the range of real 
or possible clusters that satisfy this demand would require a research 
program far beyond the scope of this Article. Here I emphasize the local 
character of the American right to free speech because that emphasis is a 
remedy for the crude and premature universalism instantiated by tunnel 
constructivism. 
There are at least two ways to think about the amorphous category of 
public discourse that has become salient since Milton. You may regard it as 
a mess that badly needs a theorist to tidy it up.395 But might it not rather be 
one of the great achievements of modern civilization? 
VI. THE PATHOLOGIES OF TUNNEL CONSTRUCTIVISM REVISITED 
Now let us reconsider the pathologies of tunnel constructivism through 
the lens of the three examples we began with: campaign finance, 
commercial speech, and copyright. In each of these cases, tunnel 
constructivism disables us from cognizing what is really at stake and our 
full range of options. 
A. Campaign Finance 
Return to the campaign finance problem. Justice Stevens, in his dissent 
in Citizens United, explained why the majority’s concept of political 
corruption was unduly narrow396: 
Corruption can take many forms. Bribery may be the paradigm case. But the 
difference between selling a vote and selling access is a matter of degree, not 
 
395 Constitutional law’s untidiness and lack of deductive clarity has produced consternation among 
some theorists. See Andrew Koppelman, Respect and Contempt in Constitutional Law, or, Is Jack 
Balkin Heartbreaking?, 71 MD. L. REV. 1126 (2012); Andrew Koppelman, Why Jack Balkin Is 
Disgusting, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 177 (2010). 
396 The Court also, as in New York Times v. Sullivan, made predictions about the chilling effect of 
the challenged restriction. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 890–91, 892, 894–97 (2010). As 
Justice Stevens noted in dissent, prior individual opinions on which the majority relied had also 
speculated that the purpose of the law might be the protection of incumbent officeholders. Little 
evidence supports these allegations. Id. at 968–70 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court, in short, offered 
guesses dressed in constructivist garb. 
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kind. And selling access is not qualitatively different from giving special 
preference to those who spent money on one’s behalf. Corruption operates 
along a spectrum, and the majority’s apparent belief that quid pro quo 
arrangements can be neatly demarcated from other improper influences does 
not accord with the theory or reality of politics.397 
Redish’s response to this is the same as the Court’s: it doesn’t matter. Any 
restriction on campaign contributions or speech is “a governmentally 
orchestrated increase in public ignorance” that, because it is “motivated by 
a paternalistic concern over the citizens’ ability to comprehend the 
expression[,] constitutes an impermissible affront to the dignity of the 
individual citizen.”398 Statutes that criminalize bribery adequately address 
the interest in preventing corruption. More generally, any suggestion that 
the law should be manipulated to change the results of the political process 
so that it is less responsive to wealthy campaign contributors and more 
responsive to everyone else, violates the absolute prohibition of viewpoint-
based regulation: “Such an approach views free expression as nothing more 
than a device to be manipulated in order to achieve predetermined 
normative political agendas.”399 
Any influence obtained by large campaign contributions is of the same 
kind that any constituent legitimately seeks from elected officials.400 This 
truism casts doubt on the corruption claim, but it does not follow that this 
cannot possibly constitute corruption. If you concentrate enough influence 
in a small enough share of people, differences of degree will become 
differences in kind. There are also consequentialist worries about 
corruption in the other direction: limiting the impact of money in politics 
will, and may be intended to, magnify the power of other untrustworthy 
organized interests, such as large media corporations.401 But determining 
the balance of distrust is an inquiry in which the Court showed no interest. 
For tunnel constructivists, even a campaign financing system that 
produces oligarchy responsive only to the interests of the wealthy is not 
inconsistent with a free and democratic society. On the contrary, it defines 
a free and democratic society. Any inequalities “derive, not from direct 
governmental manipulation of the expressive marketplace, but rather from 
events and actions wholly untied to the communicative system or its 
regulation.”402 
 
397 Id. at 961. 
398 REDISH, MONEY TALKS, supra note 113, at 5. 
399 Id. at 144. If this claim is taken literally, then it is not clear why bribery statutes are 
constitutionally permissible: such statutes restrict a form of expression by someone who wants to 
influence government decisionmaking, and the restriction is motivated solely by the desire to prevent 
that influence from becoming effective. 
400 See id. at 115–46; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 
30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663 (1997). 
401 Thanks to John McGinnis for emphasizing this. 
402 REDISH, MONEY TALKS, supra note 113, at 12. 
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Democracy is not only a set of procedures. It is a state of affairs in 
which people control their own lives and in which government power is not 
controlled by elites. A properly oriented free speech doctrine should aim at 
that result. Proponents of the severe restrictions on political speech at issue 
in Citizens United would have to show that those restrictions are necessary 
for democracy, thus understood. It is not obvious that this can be shown. 
Certainly Justice Stevens does not show it. But in the Court’s constructivist 
world, that showing, even if it could be made, would not matter. We are in 
the tunnel. Elite domination can constitute democracy. Its oppressive 
character has disappeared behind the constructivist veil of ignorance.403 
The Court clings to a constructivist model in the name of democracy, 
without attention to its consequences for democracy, like a doctor who 
constructs a model of what the patient must be like and then administers 
those treatments entailed by the model, without ever examining the patient 
to determine the consequences of the treatment (because that would be 
result oriented). 
B. Commercial Speech 
One of the most prominent triumphs of Redish’s constructivist theory 
is the Supreme Court’s growing protection of commercial advertising. In 
1970, it was taken for granted that such speech was outside the protection 
of the First Amendment. Now such speech receives substantial protection. 
It remains less protected than other speech, however404: advertising can be 
required to contain “such additional information, warnings, and 
disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive,”405 prior 
restraints may be permissible,406 and “misleading” commercial speech is 
unprotected.407 
Redish continues to press to make commercial speech as protected as 
political speech. For example, he argues for strong protection of tobacco 
advertising. Any restriction on such advertising would “reflect 
government’s paternalistic mistrust of its citizens’ ability to make lawful 
 
403 A related blind spot appears in Redish’s treatment of the activities of the House Un-American 
Activities Committee (HUAC) in the 1950s. HUAC used its subpoena power to expose many 
Americans’ former Communist affiliations, thereby creating a poisonous atmosphere of intimidation 
and silence. If the goal of free speech is to establish a vibrant and diverse community of discourse, then 
HUAC was free speech’s deadly enemy. Redish, however, thinks that “HUAC in a sense was 
facilitating the exercise of nonassociational First Amendment rights of those individuals who, because 
of their own ideological beliefs, wished to have nothing to do with any current or former member of the 
American Communist Party.” REDISH, LOGIC OF PERSECUTION, supra note 152, at 135. Redish 
acknowledges the risks of chilling speech, but thinks that the appropriateness of the Committee’s action 
under the First Amendment is a close question. Id. 
404 See REDISH, MONEY TALKS, supra note 113, at 14–18. 
405 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976). 
406 Id. 
407 See Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994). 
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choices on the basis of free and open debate.”408 Nor is it permissible when 
regulating advertising for government to be influenced by its view that 
smoking is bad for you: suppression “on the basis of government’s 
perception of the speech’s wisdom or persuasiveness undermines the basic 
premises of governmental epistemological humility, without which the 
First Amendment cannot survive.”409 Tobacco advertising can cause 
enormous harm, but Redish observes that this is also true of much political 
speech, which the government should not have the power to censor. 
Advertising restrictions are viewpoint discriminatory: the speech is 
targeted because “it conveys an unpopular (albeit perfectly lawful) social 
message that challenges the views of those who presently hold political 
power”410 in that it urges individuals “to risk the possibility of future health 
injury in order to obtain certain largely intangible social or personal 
benefits, as is true of an individual’s choice to participate in numerous 
other risk-producing activities.”411 Cartoon characters such as Joe Camel 
are presumptively protected because such images “are quite reasonably 
designed to attract the attention of adult viewers or readers.”412 Regulation 
of such speech, then, “takes on the ominous character of governmentally 
orchestrated suppression, manipulation, and mind control—the epitome of 
the type of expressive regulation the First Amendment precludes.”413 
The veil of ignorance keeps the architects of free speech doctrine from 
noticing that speech is being used to entice children to experiment with a 
deadly, addictive drug. Free speech doctrine construes those children’s 
predicament of entering adulthood already hooked on a substance that is 
 
408 REDISH, MONEY TALKS, supra note 113, at 57. 
409 Id. 
410 Id. at 60. 
411 Id. at 59. 
412 Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 589, 629 
(1996). 
413 REDISH, MONEY TALKS, supra note 113, at 60. On some questions, however, Redish becomes 
surprisingly accommodating to regulation of tobacco advertising. Five years before Lorillard Tobacco 
Co. v. Reilly, he declared that it is permissible to ban tobacco ads near schools and specifically referred 
to proposed federal regulations that would ban advertising within 1000 feet of schools and playgrounds, 
which is what the statute invalidated in Lorillard did. Redish, supra note 412, at 607–08. (His general 
point might be distinguished from the facts of Lorillard, where the Court noted that “[i]n some 
geographical areas,” the law “would constitute nearly a complete ban” on advertising tobacco. Lorillard 
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 562 (2001).) He says that these are “appropriate time-place-
manner restrictions,” Redish, supra note 412, at 607 n.89, but how can they be categorized in this way 
when they are obviously not content or viewpoint neutral? He also accepts mandated warnings on 
cigarette packets, id. at 625, and even the ban on broadcast advertising of cigarettes, see id. at 631–34, 
in each case saying that these rules may simply be too well-established to change. It is surprising to find 
him making such concessions. He is, as we have seen, unreconciled with other longstanding rules 
inconsistent with his theoretical commitments, such as the ban on obscenity. See supra notes 142–43 
and accompanying text. 
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spectacularly difficult to quit and likely to kill them as a manifestation of 
their freedom. 
The protection of commercial speech has other dangerous entailments. 
One of the most pressing problems facing the United States is the “war on 
drugs,” which has become a humanitarian and financial catastrophe.414 One 
possible alternative is to legalize recreational drugs but to tightly control 
their distribution and bar their advertisement. That last step, however, 
violates Redish’s Constitution. You might want to legalize cocaine to 
eliminate the illegal traffic that is destroying our inner cities. But then you 
must also permit the formidable persuasive resources of modern advertising 
to be mobilized on that substance’s behalf. Imagine what Joe Camel could 
do with those enormous nostrils. 
This result is hard to reconcile with the idea that it is sensible to 
outlaw cocaine in the first place. If consumers must not be paternalized, 
then it is impossible to justify the outlawing of the drug. If such 
paternalism, with its horrendous human consequences, is permissible, then 
why is this milder solution not permissible? The justification I propose is 
not the “greater includes the lesser” analysis that Justice Rehnquist offered, 
which would give government absolute power to bar communication about 
any lawful product so long as government had the power to criminalize 
it.415 That justification would give the government almost boundless power 
to restrict speech.416 Rather, the best justification for outlawing cocaine is 
that there is a very small class of activities—call them vices—that tend to 
overwhelm people’s rational faculties and cause them great harm, and 
cocaine use is one of these. Perhaps this category, narrowly bounded, 
should be brought into free speech law so that tighter restrictions may be 
placed on the advertisement of products that have long been understood to 
be associated with this kind of destruction. A new First Amendment 
category of unprotected speech—call it “vice advertising”—would emerge, 
restricted to a very small category of merchandising. Notice what I’m 
doing here: trying to invent free speech rules that preserve a broad field for 
unrestrained discourse, while directly addressing the harm that speech can 
do. Whether or not you agree with my proposal, my larger methodological 
point is that this is how free speech doctrine should be created.417 
 
414 See Andrew Koppelman, Drug Policy and the Liberal Self, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 279 (2006). 
415 Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 345–46 (1986) (“[T]he greater 
power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of 
casino gambling . . . .”). There would still be restrictions on the government’s ability to bar advertising 
of contraceptives because it cannot bar their sale. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
416 Redish notes this in Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, supra note 412, at 599–604. 
417 The Lorillard case raises another problem: the state was restricting speech to adults in order to 
prevent the speech from reaching children. In Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957), the Court 
held that a state could not “reduce the adult population . . . to reading only what is fit for children.” But 
Butler was a case in which the speech was of the highest value—the law covered all printed materials of 
any kind—and the harm to children of exposure to indecent material was doubtful and speculative. 
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Tobacco and cocaine are extreme cases, but there is a deeper problem 
with full protection of commercial speech. Redish reasons that because 
commercial speech should be entitled to the same protection as political 
speech, it should receive the protection of New York Times v. Sullivan: 
false and misleading advertising should be actionable only if the speaker 
knows that it is false or publishes with reckless disregard of whether it is 
false or not.418 
Redish’s proposal would revolutionize the law of consumer protection. 
Under the present standard of Central Hudson,419 “misleading” commercial 
speech is unprotected. Misleading speech is a fuzzy category, and the Court 
has not explained its meaning: All speech misleads some people. The 
definition of misleading speech is a normative question: We must decide 
how many people are too many and how much misinformation is too 
much.420 
The federal agencies charged with enforcing statutory prohibitions of 
misleading commercial speech have, of course, issued regulations that in 
practice clear up the fuzziness. Whether they do so consistently with the 
requirements of free speech is another question. Redish’s argument, if 
accepted, would entail dismantling a great deal of consumer protection 
law.421 
 
With respect to tobacco advertising, the value of the speech is lower and the harm is far more severe. 
Thanks to Martin Redish for demanding clarification of this point. 
418 REDISH, MONEY TALKS, supra note 113, at 55–56. He explains this proposal in detail in Martin 
H. Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific Expression and the Twilight 
Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1433 (1990) [hereinafter Redish, Product Health 
Claims]. He acknowledges that it is difficult to prove knowledge. Even though he is troubled by 
“regulating even good faith factual assertions,” he suggests that “in the area of product health claims, a 
complete absence of even arguably probative scientific data to support the claim reasonably could be 
found to constitute recklessness.” Id. at 1455. It is not clear, however, how recklessness can fairly be 
attributed to a marketer who doubts the veracity of science, as many marketers of alternative remedies 
do. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985) (“A person acts recklessly with respect to a material 
element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
material element exists or will result from his conduct.”). Redish would also allow regulation even 
absent recklessness if “serious physical harm” could result from a consumer’s acceptance of a 
scientifically inaccurate claim. Redish, Product Health Claims, supra, at 1456. Finally, the interest in 
avoiding consumer confusion can be addressed by “requiring inclusion of a disclaimer of government 
approval.” Id. at 1457. But why is this not impermissible compelled speech? See Post, supra note 174, 
at 26–28; Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and Coerced 
Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555 (2006). 
Redish does not want any differential in treatment of commercial and noncommercial speech, but if 
books could be censored whenever they made claims that were not supported by even arguably 
probative scientific data, the result would be a far more oppressive scientific orthodoxy than the state is 
now constitutionally permitted to impose. 
419 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
420 See Shiffrin, supra note 328, at 1219. For an analysis of considerations that are relevant if this 
problem is approached on a case-by-case basis, see Strauss, supra note 112, at 369–70. 
421 Schauer notes that “the Securities and Exchange Commission, the National Labor Relations 
Board, the Federal Trade Commission, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, the Office of 
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Consider food advertisements. FDA regulations provide that health 
claims for food must be supported by “the totality of publicly available 
scientific evidence,” and there must be “significant scientific agreement, 
among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate 
such claims, that the claim is supported by such evidence.”422 Applying this 
standard, the FDA allows marketers to assert only a very few specified 
relationships between foods and the prevention of disease,423 and marketers 
may not make any health claims about certain foods if the foods contain 
nutrients at levels that increase the risk of disease (such as more than 
thirteen grams of fat per serving).424 A food manufacturer, even if it 
sincerely believes that its product prevents a disease that is not on the 
FDA’s approved list, is required to remain silent about its belief when 
marketing the product. The FDA’s evident assumption—an assumption that 
is entirely realistic—is that “an adequate understanding . . . would require 
more time and resources than the average consumer could reasonably be 
asked to invest.”425 
Here is another example. Under the FTC Act, a claim or a material 
omission of fact made in an advertisement is actionable if it is likely to 
mislead the reasonable consumer.426 A representation may be made by 
implied claims, which the FTC determines by looking at the overall context 
of the advertisement as well as its literal words. If an advertiser cannot 
show a reasonable basis for its claim, the FTC will force the advertiser to 
cease making the claim until it can be substantiated.427 Neither the FDA nor 
the FTC standards turn at all on the seller’s state of mind. Neither 
knowledge nor reckless disregard of the falsity matters. 
 
the Register of Copyrights, the law of evidence, regimes of professional regulation, and quite a few 
other established mechanisms” are likely to remain undisturbed by free speech law. Schauer, supra note 
211, at 1806. 
422 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(c) (2012). 
423 The permissible health-related claims under the regulations are (1) calcium, vitamin D, and 
osteoporosis, (2) dietary lipids and cancer, (3) sodium and hypertension, (4) dietary saturated fat and 
cholesterol and heart disease, (5) fiber-containing grain products, fruits, vegetables, and cancer, 
(6) fiber-containing grain products, fruits, vegetables, and heart disease, (7) fruits and vegetables and 
cancer, (8) folate and neural tube defects, (9) dietary noncariogenic carbohydrate sweeteners and dental 
caries, (10) soluble fiber from certain foods and risk of coronary heart disease, (11) soy protein and risk 
of coronary heart disease, and (12) plant sterol/stanol esters and risk of coronary heart disease. Id. 
§§ 101.72–.83. The regulations go on to elaborately specify precisely how these relationships can be 
described to the consumer. 
424 Id. § 101.14(a)(4). 
425 Post, supra note 174, at 41 n.190. These regulations are sensible and valuable, but what I write 
here should not be construed to bless everything the FDA does. See MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: 
HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES NUTRITION AND HEALTH (rev. & expanded ed. 2007). 
426 Douglas W. Hyman, The Regulation of Health Claims in Food Advertising: Have the FTC and 
the FDA Finally Reached a Common Ground?, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 191, 195 (1996). 
427 Id. at 195–97. 
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Why should it? The consumer is equally harmed whether the seller is 
an unscrupulous swindler or a sincere but deluded quack. Under Redish’s 
proposal, however, absent the risk of serious physical injury, everything 
would turn on that distinction. Consumer protection would be much harder 
to provide. People would be misled about the value of what they were 
purchasing. 
If truthful claims are absolutely protected, then a fatty, sugary product 
with insignificant traces of vitamins would be able to truthfully put 
“contains vitamins!” on its label. New Lipido Chips could compete with 
other, genuinely healthy products. Some consumers would be able to figure 
out the differences between the really healthy products and the 
misleadingly labeled ones, but a lot of people would be fooled. They would 
consume less nutritious foods, leading to higher levels of disease and 
shorter lives. Sickness and death tend to impede self-realization. But, 
according to Redish, none of that matters. The really important thing is 
preserving free speech principles.428 
One of the classic single-value constructivist justifications for free 
speech is the advancement of truth. An unregulated marketplace of ideas 
will promote the advancement of truth better than any government 
regulation could. This is an empirical claim, subject to testing, and it turns 
out to be true in some contexts and false in others. Government regulation 
of speech is truth advancing in some contexts and not others, but which 
contexts are which cannot be settled from the scholar’s armchair.429 
Tunnel constructivism makes a different use of the truth rationale: 
once the consumer is assumed to be perfectly rational and capable of 
processing information, then the “advancement of truth” becomes available 
as an ideological rationale for constitutional rules that will in fact promote 
deception and misinformation. 
In both the campaign finance and the advertising cases, the large 
corporate entities that prey upon ordinary citizens are merely the 
environment in which liberty is exercised. And any effort to restrict the 
speech that produces these results would infringe on liberty. Speech 
regulators may not even know that these consequences exist. 
 
428 On the destructive effects of full First Amendment protection for misleading commercial 
speech, see also Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of “False” Is: Falsity and 
Misleadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 227 (2007). Redish does show 
that producer advertising and labeling has been a source of valuable information about the benefits of 
fiber for significant numbers of consumers who were not reached by other sources. Redish, Product 
Health Claims, supra note 418, at 1460 n.153. But this took place in an environment in which that 
speech was screened for accuracy by the state. There may be overreach by regulators, and some valid 
information may not be reaching the public, but this calls for adjustment, not wholesale destruction, of 
the regulatory regime. 
429 See ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD 189–217 (1999); Frederick Schauer, 
Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897 (2010). 
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Regulation in both cases is, of course, paternalistic. It treats people as 
if they were not perfectly rational. But people in fact are not perfectly 
rational. Regulation that pushes people’s choices in one direction rather 
than another can therefore facilitate self-realization by helping to bring 
about the choices that those people would make if they were perfectly 
rational.430 
Consider one more example of paternalistic government regulation of 
commercial speech. Medicare Advantage (Medicare Part C) is a program in 
which the government pays private insurers a monthly capitated rate for 
each Medicare patient who enrolls in the insurers’ private plans. Each 
company then must pay to provide all Medicare services to each 
beneficiary. As part of their agreement with the federal government, each 
company must agree that all marketing materials are subject to prior review 
by the regulator agency, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 
Department of Health and Human Services.431 The materials must be 
submitted for agency approval at least forty-five days before they are 
distributed.432 
This is, of course, a prior restraint on speech. Worse yet, it is a 
licensing scheme just like the one Milton opposed, in which the exact 
language must be approved by a government regulator before it can be 
published. Of course, this restraint only applies to the beneficiaries of 
government contracts, and no one is required to contract with the 
government. But it is settled law that government grants cannot be 
conditioned on a speaker’s agreement to relinquish its right to spend its 
own money on speech the government does not like.433 If commercial 
speech is entitled to exactly the same level of protection as noncommercial 
speech, this regulation is unconstitutional. But should it matter at all that 
the recipients of the information are elderly people who are likely to be 
confused by aggressive marketing of insurance products? 
Redish thinks that any diminished protection for commercial speech 
constitutes a kind of viewpoint discrimination based on disagreement with 
the capitalist values that advertising conveys. He offers two arguments to 
support this conclusion. One argument claims that as with obscenity, 
diminished protection is based on “some form of hostility to or disdain for 
the capitalist system of which commercial speech is a part.”434 This ad 
hominem argument reveals again the unreliability of reverse engineering. It 
 
430 See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
431 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 422.2260–.2276 (2012). Thanks to Brian Glassman for telling me about these 
regulations. 
432 See id. § 422.2262. 
433 See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
434 Redish, Commercial Speech, supra note 113, at 121; see also REDISH, MONEY TALKS, supra 
note 113, at 21, 41–43. 
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rests on speculation about the motives of those who support diminished 
protection. It may be true of some scholars who take this position, but 
Redish makes the far stronger claim that there are no other grounds for 
nonprotection. 
Robert Post, for example, thinks that the basis of diminished 
protection for commercial speech is the capitalism-friendly goals of 
consumer protection and “transparent and efficient markets.”435 To expand 
on Post’s point: Modern capitalism depends on high levels of trust among 
strangers. Without such trust, it is impossible for a large-scale economy to 
operate.436 Government regulation of misleading commercial speech makes 
it more likely that people will buy unfamiliar products because it 
encourages them to trust commercial representations. Regulation thus 
facilitates the operation of the capitalist system. Similarly with offerings of 
securities. To say that the only motive for diminished protection of 
commercial speech is hostility to capitalism gets matters exactly backward. 
Hostility to capitalism should lead to very strong protection for misleading 
commercial speech. 
Redish’s other argument is that the nonprotection of commercial 
speech rests on “moral and/or socio-political considerations that are 
external to the First Amendment.”437 Any effort to shape public discourse in 
the name of values that are not derived from free speech principles is “an 
indirect form of viewpoint discrimination”438 because the rules are adopted 
in hopes of fostering a public discourse that contains a set of viewpoints 
more to the legislator’s liking than those that would otherwise exist. Redish 
is right that his veil of ignorance would filter out such considerations. But 
that brings back the fundamental question of whether it is a good idea to 
reside behind Redish’s veil of ignorance. 
C. Copyright 
In the campaign finance and tobacco advertising cases, determinate 
results were reached by reasoning within the veil of ignorance. My 
objection was not that tunnel constructivist reasoning is impossible, but 
rather that it produces illiberal and destructive results. With copyright, 
however, one cannot even begin thinking about what the law should be 
from behind a veil of ignorance. There is no way to resolve these questions 
at the level of high theory—or more precisely, trying to do so misses the 
point. The purpose of copyright law is to foster a vibrant sphere of 
discourse in which it is possible for authors who are not independently 
wealthy to quit their day jobs. That, however, is a result, not a process. 
 
435 Post, supra note 176, at 177. 
436 See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF 
PROSPERITY (1995). 
437 Redish, Commercial Speech, supra note 113, at 110; see also id. at 113. 
438 REDISH, MONEY TALKS, supra note 113, at 111. 
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Engineering it should be an undertaking in the spirit of Milton, Mill, and 
Emerson. It depends on understanding how the world works and calibrating 
the law to what we learn about the world. 
The proper entailment of constructivist free speech theory might be to 
do away with copyright law altogether. Copyright law casually violates 
many of the core principles of free speech jurisprudence. Content-based 
restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional and subject to 
strict scrutiny. Yet to tell whether a work infringes on a copyright, one 
must read it, read the copyrighted work, and compare.439 Prior restraints are 
supposedly never permissible, but in copyright cases, courts issue 
injunctions all the time.440 Viewpoint discrimination is supposed to be 
unconstitutional per se, but borrowing from a copyrighted work is more 
likely to be permissible if it is a parody that is “critical” of that work.441 
Regulations of speech are not constitutional when they prohibit particular 
ways of expressing ideas, rather than the ideas themselves. The Court 
rejects the notion that ideas are distinguishable from the way that they are 
expressed, yet copyright law turns on precisely that distinction.442 
Copyright law is not a restriction on the time, place, or manner of speech 
because it does not permit ample alternative channels for the same 
speech.443 Rights vary depending on the identity of the speaker: works 
created “for hire,” typically by employees of entertainment corporations, 
get different durations than works created by individuals.444 Even with 
respect to unprotected categories of speech, such as obscenity, libel, 
incitement, and fighting words, the Court has developed rules ensuring that 
restrictions do not infringe on core speech interests.445 Yet there is 
“astonishingly little contemporary judicial discussion of copyright’s First 
Amendment implications.”446 
The limits of tunnel constructivism are clearest in libertarian debates 
over copyright law. Libertarians fall into two opposing camps on the 
intellectual property issue. One, friendly to very strong intellectual property 
rights, holds that the creation of ideas is a kind of labor. Since individuals 
have a natural right to the fruits of their labor, a person who creates a work 
 
439 See Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 
1, 5 (2002). 
440 See id. at 6; Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in 
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998). 
441 See Rubenfeld, supra note 439, at 6–7, 17. 
442 See id. at 13–16. 
443 See Volokh, supra note 25, at 703–11. 
444 See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006). There are other major differences in treatment of works for hire too 
complex to go into here. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 5.03 (2009). Thanks to Peter DiCola for calling my attention to this area of copyright doctrine. 
445 Rubenfeld, supra note 439, at 7. 
446 Id. 
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should have an absolute right (in perpetuity?) to control its use.447 The other 
camp, suspicious of monopoly privileges created by government, notes that 
this is a very peculiar kind of property right: a copyright over work means 
that the copyright holder can tell another person what he can or (more 
pertinently) cannot print with his own press, using his own ink and his own 
paper. There is no scarcity that requires government intervention: one 
person copying a book does not prevent anyone else from copying the same 
book. It follows that there should be no intellectual property rights at all.448 
Both libertarian positions are tunnel constructivisms that start with different 
sets of assumptions and work out their logical implications. Each depends 
on fetishizing its own favored property rights, which have nothing to do 
with the actual liberty of human beings in the world. They simply differ 
about which ones to fetishize.449 The inability of both to justify their 
starting points guarantees that their debate will remain sterile. 
The pathologies of libertarianism matter here because they have 
infected copyright law. Copyright has come to look more like a full 
property right than a limited government grant for a particular purpose. The 
consequence has been an increasingly tight bottleneck for speech by small, 
independent speakers and a loss of creative diversity in the arts. 
Jed Rubenfeld responds to these pathologies with his own deductive 
theory of free speech protection. The core of free speech, he claims, is the 
“freedom of imagination.” That freedom broadly means “the freedom to 
explore the entire universe of feeling-mediated-by-ideas. It means the 
freedom to explore, without state penalty, any thought, any image, any 
emotion, any melody, as far as the imagining mind may take it.”450 In 
practice, this would mean that copyright protection only applies to the 
exact text or image produced by the author. Persons other than the author 
would have the right to make modifications and derivative works, subject 
only to a claim for disgorgement of the proportionate share of profits 
attributable to using the underlying work. Injunctions would never be 
available for anything other than literal pirating and copying. 
There are two difficulties with Rubenfeld’s principle. The first is its 
foundation, which is vulnerable for the reasons we have already seen with 
Redish. Rubenfeld disavows “[g]iant-sized First Amendment theories” that 
try to derive free speech from democracy or autonomy.451 “The First 
Amendment is not a ‘universal right of man’; it is a piece of the ineluctably 
 
447 See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29 (2005). 
448 See, e.g., N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2008). 
449 For an attempt to devise a middle ground, which itself characteristically purports to be a 
deduction from first principles, see AYN RAND, Patents and Copyrights, in CAPITALISM: THE 
UNKNOWN IDEAL 130 (1967). 
450 Rubenfeld, supra note 439, at 38. 
451 Id. at 30. 
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political, historical United States Constitution.”452 From the paradigm case 
of works of art, Rubenfeld derives his principle of freedom of imagination. 
However, to whatever extent the freedom of imagination entails a 
revolution in present practice, it cannot be presented as merely an inference 
from American practice. The speech-infringing copyright rules that 
Rubenfeld denounces are as much a part of American practice as the 
protection of art. The latter cannot provide the ground from which to attack 
the former because Rubenfeld’s decision to base his rules on local practice, 
without more, leaves him no basis for privileging either over the other.453 
Rubenfeld’s second difficulty is that his proposed rules could produce 
unfortunate incentive effects—just the kind of effects with which copyright 
law is legitimately concerned. Netanel observes that some secondary works 
that are similar to the original, such as edited books or films, can act as 
market substitutes for the original. Some works, such as screenplays, are 
created only as the basis for derivative work. Some derivative works, such 
as film adaptations of books, take years to produce and require significant 
capital investment. In all of these cases, the incentive to create the original 
may disappear unless the creator is given the power to bar derivative 
works, at least for a few years.454 
Netanel’s objections are sympathetic ones. They preserve the 
operation of Rubenfeld’s principle with a few narrowly drawn exceptions. 
The exceptions, however, raise all Rubenfeld’s free speech objections 
anew. They are content based. They authorize prior restraints. (So does 
Rubenfeld, with respect to outright copying.) Netanel’s approach is 
consistent with the greater protection of parodies, a distinction that is 
viewpoint based. 
More generally, rules of copyright law necessarily restrict some 
speech for the sake of a broader and more vibrant world of speech. This 
kind of enterprise is quite foreign from free speech theory as the Court 
conceives it: “[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of 
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of 
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment . . . .”455 That, however, is 
what copyright law does. The public gets one mix of publicly available 
books, music, and movies if there is no copyright protection and a different 
 
452 Id. 
453 My account of free speech is also based on local practice, but I am explicitly privileging an 
ideal, to the derogation of contrary aspects of existing practice. Perhaps Rubenfeld could do the same, 
but then he would have to be more explicitly normative than he is, and I suspect that for the reasons I 
lay out immediately below, he would want to embrace a less absolute principle. 
454 NETANEL, supra note 24, at 198. 
455 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976). In the same opinion, however, the Court endorsed 
a teleological vision: “[T]he First Amendment . . . was designed to secure the widest possible 
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources . . . .” Id. at 49 (quoting N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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mix if there is strong copyright protection; one mix if derivative works are 
enjoinable and a different mix if they are not. 
Thus, it is no surprise that the critics of the modern copyright regime, 
which has become far more producer protective since Congress enacted 
major amendments in 1976,456 have not been content to make the 
tautological point that copyright stifles some speech. Instead, they have 
offered specific evidence of the speech that has been stifled and compared 
it with the speech that is thus facilitated in order to persuade the reader that 
the tradeoff is not worth it.457 Netanel correctly concludes that the 
appropriate level of copyright protections cannot be determined “without 
making value judgments about the types and mix of expression and 
speakers we want our copyright system to foster.”458 
More generally, questions of how to preserve the thriving sphere of 
public discourse and facilitate the participation of a broad range of diverse 
and antagonistic views reach beyond free speech law or even intellectual 
property. They affect matters, such as the design of the Internet, the 
architecture of computer code, and the regulation of telecommunications 
technology, that do not involve any coercive sanctions upon speech.459 
Here, too, we must make value judgments about the kind of universe of 
discourse we wish to inhabit. 
Such value judgments would constitute the twilight zone of viewpoint 
discrimination that Redish thinks is forbidden: we would adopt rules for the 
regulation of speech because we hope to encourage certain speech and 
discourage other speech. “[T]he ideological neutrality of the system of free 
expression is essential to that system’s very existence; without it, the 
system will inevitably implode.”460 Redish does not, however, tell us how 
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such choices can be avoided in copyright law. As long as there is copyright 
law, the system will reflect such choices. 
CONCLUSION 
Redish, the leading theorist of free speech tunnel constructivism, 
argues that “the principle of epistemological humility . . . underlies the 
entire concept of free speech protection.”461 His veil of ignorance follows 
from that principle: “[P]reference for a particular ideology should never 
play any part in justifying governmental restriction of expression.”462 
However, as Larry Alexander observes, the principle of 
epistemological humility, which Redish thinks is characteristic of any free 
speech theory, generates internal contradiction: 
Freedom of expression is paradoxical within any plausible normative theory. 
That is because the requirement of evaluative neutrality is the core of any right 
of freedom of expression, but evaluative neutrality cannot coexist with any 
normative theory. Any normative theory, liberal or not, will perforce take 
positions on what ought to be done given our best judgment of what the world 
is like. To the extent that expression . . . threatens to produce states of affairs 
inconsistent with those the normative theory prescribes, to that extent the 
normative theory must, as a matter of logical consistency, rule the expression 
to be pernicious and of negative value.463 
The consequence of the paradox is that no theory of free speech can 
maintain absolute epistemological humility. Even a theory that made 
freedom of expression so absolute as to override all other human interests 
“would face a paradox in dealing with expression that threatened to 
undermine it.”464 
This point is devastating only if free speech must take the form Redish 
describes, committed to absolute evaluative neutrality. However, as we 
have seen, the style of reasoning committed to absolute evaluative 
neutrality is a fairly recent development in free speech theory. Milton, Mill, 
Hand, Holmes, Brandeis, Meiklejohn, and Emerson were not committed to 
absolute evaluative neutrality. Of course, they did aspire to a field of 
neutrality—any conception of free speech will do that—but within limits. 
They were unapologetically devoted to certain substantive values. It was 
from those substantive values that they derived their commitment to free 
speech, which allowed for limitations.465 
 
461 Id. at 48. 
462 Id. at 43. 
463 ALEXANDER, supra note 174, at 177. 
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that could undermine his system. 
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of the Good, a partisan view among partisan views.” Id. at 169. He declares it unattractive because 
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Samuel Freeman has suggested that the recurring popularity of 
libertarianism in the United States is the consequence of living in a free 
market system in which people are led to believe in the sanctity of property 
and the justice of market distributions.466 Once they come to believe that 
they have a fundamental right to whatever the market delivers, they will 
resist taxation to pay for public infrastructure or for health care and income 
support for the poor, elderly, or handicapped. This is a problem for 
liberalism as an ideal: “[C]lassical liberal institutions may be prone to 
disintegrate into libertarianism.”467 Free speech may present an analogous 
problem: In a society that values speech, speech-protective rules can be 
fetishized in the same way that libertarians fetishize property rules, with 
similarly illiberal results. 
Free speech theory should return to its roots. It should stand for a very 
specific understanding of freedom and individual dignity, which it seeks to 
realize in the actual lives of human beings in the world. 
Any theory of liberty commits itself to neutrality about some 
questions. But no individual commitment to neutrality entails commitment 
to every kind of neutrality.468 The neutrality entailed by free speech does 
not logically mean that we must consent to rule by moneyed elites, or that 
tobacco advertisers must be free to prey on children, or that we cannot 
recalibrate the rules of copyright to produce less Disney and more small, 
independent writers and artists. 
Constructivism is a valuable rhetorical tool. It provides one useful lens 
through which to think about government. But our ultimate goal should not 
be elegantly constructed, deductive rules of free speech. It should be a free 
society made up of free people. 
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